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AVOIDING JEOPARDY, WITHOUT 
THE QUESTIONS: RECOVERY 
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMS  
FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES IN 
WESTERN RIVER BASINS 
Reed D. Benson* 
The application of the Endangered Species Act to water resources has generated 
much controversy in the American West. In several western river basins,  
however, Recovery Implementation Programs (RIPs) provide an alternative, 
collaborative approach to ESA compliance. These programs offer an enhanced 
role for states and stakeholders in ESA decisionmaking, and increased certainty 
that ESA requirements will not disrupt ongoing water project operations and  
established uses. This Article examines the origins, purposes, and elements of various 
RIPs, with particular emphasis on these programs’ approach to compliance with 
the requirements of ESA section 7 for federal agency actions. The Article also 
considers the legal and political successes achieved by RIPs, and concludes by  
posing and analyzing certain questions regarding the popularity and future of 
these programs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court decided Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill in 
1978,1 it not only blocked completion of a nearly finished federal dam to 
save the endangered snail darter; it also elevated the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA)2 into one of the nation’s most powerful environmental laws, 
intended to “halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever 
the cost.”3 Congress responded by ordering the completion of the dam, but 
largely preserved the relevant provision of the ESA.4 Congress later adopted 
a set of ESA amendments that included the following statement: “It is 
further declared to be the policy of Congress that Federal agencies shall  
 
                                                                                                                      
 1. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
 3. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184. 
 4. See Holly Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow Escape for a Broad New 
Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 109, 132 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck 
eds., 2005). 
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cooperate with State and local agencies to resolve water resource issues in 
concert with conservation of endangered species.”5 
Despite this policy of cooperation, the record of water resource issues 
involving endangered species is filled with conflict, including some of the 
greatest controversies in the history of the ESA. For the most part, these 
controversies have involved federal water projects in the western United 
States, built and operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR). The 
Klamath Basin water crisis, where many farmers on one of the oldest recla-
mation projects lost nearly their entire water supply in the drought year of 
2001, was perhaps the most intense dispute.6 Two years later, a court of 
appeals holding that farmers and cities on the Rio Grande could lose “their” 
federal project water to an endangered minnow7 sparked outrage in New 
Mexico; Albuquerque’s mayor blasted both “the fringe environmental com-
munity, which . . . wants to take water from the mouths of our children” and 
“federal judges who are accountable to nobody in our society, who are not 
elected, who hide behind their nice robes and tall desks, [who] want to put 
the future of this community in jeopardy.”8 The nation’s hottest endangered 
species conflict today involves the Federal Central Valley Project in Cali-
fornia, pitting the needs of endangered salmon and Delta smelt against 
irrigation and other traditional water uses. ESA requirements in the Central 
Valley have been heavily litigated for two decades,9 and the cases show no 
sign of stopping10—nor does the political controversy over limits on water 
deliveries.11  
                                                                                                                      
 5. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (2006). There was a push in 1982 to weaken the ESA, and 
some members of Congress sought to insert a strong statement of deference to state water 
law into the Act, like the “Wallop Amendment” codified as § 101(g) of the Clean Water Act, 
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2006). That effort failed, however, leading to the policy statement 
regarding federal-state cooperation. A. Dan Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western 
Water Rights, 20 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 1, 19 (1985). 
 6. See HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH 
BASIN: MACHO LAW, COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS 1–4 (2008). 
 7. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated as 
moot, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 8. See Reed D. Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much In Common: Considering the 
Similarities Between Western Water Law and the Endangered Species Act, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
29, 63 (2004) (quoting Mayor Martin Chavez); see also Lara Katz, History of the Minnow 
Litigation and Its Implications for the Future of Reservoir Operations on the Rio Grande, 47 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 675, 682 (2007) (stating that the court’s ruling “was effectively a declaration of 
war for water users, the State, and politicians . . . .”). 
 9. See, e.g., Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1993) (appli-
cation of ESA to water contract renewals); O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 
1995) (USBR authority to reduce water deliveries to comply with ESA); Tulare Lake Basin 
Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (ESA restrictions on water 
deliveries as taking of property). 
 10. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Salazar, 686 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(addressing the applicability of the ESA to certain water supply contracts); Consol. Salmonid 
Benson_Final_Printer_Ready_FINAL_12June2013 7/18/2013 4:21 PM 
476 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:2 
Other parts of the West, however, have indeed seen cooperation among 
federal, state, and local entities over ESA issues involving water resources. 
In the Upper Colorado River Basin, the federal government has worked 
cooperatively with three states, water users, and conservation groups for 
twenty-five years under a program that seeks to protect both water users 
and endangered species.12 The San Juan River Basin has had a very similar 
program since 1992,13 and in the Platte River Basin, a cooperative program 
was initiated in 199714 and finalized in 2006.15 In each of these basins, ESA 
compliance for USBR project operations and other activities has been  
governed by a Recovery Implementation Plan (RIP). These programs seek 
to allow continued water use and development while also implementing 
certain measures to benefit endangered fish and bird species that live in and 
along the Upper Colorado, San Juan, and Platte Rivers. Every one of these 
established programs has provided years of ESA compliance for water-
related activities, with little controversy and no litigation—and a brand new 
RIP seeks to do the same in New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande Basin.16 
RIPs are not off-the-shelf ESA products; unlike critical habitat desig-
nations or biological opinions, they do not specifically appear in the statute 
                                                                                                                      
Cases, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Consol. Delta Smelt Cases, 717 F. Supp. 2d 
1021 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (both addressing validity of ESA biological opinions regarding  
Central Valley Project operations). 
 11. For example, the Water and Power Subcommittee of the U.S. House Natural 
Resources Committee calls the Central Valley situation a “man-made drought,” and blames 
court decisions requiring allocation of water to endangered fish. Because of this situation, 
the Subcommittee’s website says, “the San Joaquin Valley is in danger of becoming a dust 
bowl unless immediate action is taken to change policies that put the needs of fish above the 
livelihood of people.” The Man-Made California Drought, NATURAL RES. COMM., 
http://www.naturalresources.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=5921 (last visited Sept. 5, 2012). 
 12. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL RECOVERY 
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR ENDANGERED FISH SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO 
RIVER BASIN (1987) [hereinafter Upper Colorado RIP Program Document]. 
 13. SAN JUAN RIVER BASIN RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM, FINAL 
PROGRAM DOCUMENT (2010), available at www.fws.gov/southwest/sjrip/pdf/DOC_Final_ 
Program_Document_appendices_2010.pdf [hereinafter San Juan RIP Program Document]. 
 14. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT FOR PLATTE RIVER RESEARCH AND OTHER 
EFFORTS RELATING TO ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITATS ALONG THE CENTRAL PLATTE 
RIVER, NEBRASKA (1997), available at https://platteriverprogram.org/PubsAndData/ 
ProgramLibrary/Cooperative%20Agreement%20for%20Central%20Platte%20River.pdf. 
 15. PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT 
(2006), available at https://www.platteriverprogram.org/pubsanddata/programlibrary/ 
cooperative%20agreement%20for%20central%20platte%20river.pdf. 
 16. MIDDLE RIO GRANDE ENDANGERED SPECIES COLLABORATIVE PROGRAM, 
DRAFT MIDDLE RIO GRANDE COLLABORATIVE RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM 
(RIP) DOCUMENT, 3 (July 2012 Draft) [hereinafter Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program 
Document] (on file with author). 
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or even the implementing rules.17 Thus, RIPs have no official definition, 
but have been described as “voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiatives devel-
oped by the [U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service] that seek to balance water use 
and development with the recovery of federally-listed species.”18 This de-
scription is generally accurate, but no two RIPs are quite alike in their 
composition, objectives, and operations. For example, unlike the four RIPs 
identified in the previous paragraph, at least two others—the Recovery 
Implementation Committee in the Missouri River Basin19 and the Edwards 
Aquifer RIP in Texas20—are not relied upon to ensure ongoing ESA  
compliance in the operation of federal water projects,21 and therefore these 
relatively new programs22 are not considered in this article. Another general 
observation about RIPs is that they are found only in western waters,  
primarily river systems with major federal water projects. In other words, 
all of the existing RIPs relate to the management and use of water resources 
in the western United States.23 
                                                                                                                      
 17. See infra notes 70–73 (critical habitat designations), 95-101 (biological opinions), 
and accompanying text. The ESA does provide for recovery plans (see infra notes 73–86 and 
accompanying text), but nothing in statute or rule suggests that these plans would lead to 
official programs involving multiple sovereigns, formal governance structures, and multi-
million dollar budgets, as the RIPs have become. See infra Part III.A (describing various 
aspects of RIPs). 
 18. ROBERT GULLEY, EDWARDS AQUIFER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM 
(EARIP) 2 (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.edwardsrip.org/pdfs/eariphistory 
March2010.pdf. 
 19. MISSOURI RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., MISSOURI RIVER 
RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE FACT SHEET (2011), available at 
http://www.moriverrecovery.org/mrrp/f?p=136:32:0::NO:::: (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
 20. ROBERT GULLEY, EDWARDS AQUIFER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM 
(EARIP) SUMMARY (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.edwardsrip.org/pdfs/eariphistory 
March2010.pdf. 
 21. The Edwards Aquifer RIP produced a Habitat Conservation Plan to ensure take 
coverage for non-federal actions under ESA section 10, rather than providing compliance for 
federal agency actions under section 7. Id. This effort was rewarded when the FWS recently 
approved a section 10 permit based on the plan developed by the RIP. Edwards Aquifer 
Recovery Implementation Program Habitat Conservation Plan, 78 Fed. Reg. 11218 (Feb. 15, 
2013). The Missouri River Recovery Implementation Committee is heavily involved in 
developing and implementing an adaptive management program regarding Missouri River 
operations and habitat, and although it grew out of a 2003 consultation on Missouri River 
operations, it is not designed to ensure section 7 compliance for ongoing or new activities in 
the basin. Telephone Interview with Michael Thabault, Ass’t Regional Director for Ecological 
Services, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, in Denver, Colo. (Sept. 5, 2012). Mr. Thabault has 
primary oversight of all major water-related recovery programs covered by the Service’s 
Denver regional office, including those on the Missouri, Platte, and Upper Colorado. 
 22. Both the Missouri River and Edwards Aquifer RIPs were established in the mid-
2000s. See infra notes 208–209 and accompanying text. 
 23. Telephone Interview with Michael Thabault, supra note 21. 
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This Article addresses Recovery Implementation Programs for endan-
gered species in the context of four western river basins where the USBR is 
a key water supplier and manager. Rather than focus in detail on any  
particular program, this Article addresses these RIPs as a group, representing 
a unique approach to ESA compliance that has taken root in the western 
water context. Part I of this Article provides context, outlining federal and 
state roles regarding water resources in the West. Part II explains the  
requirements of the ESA, focusing on federal agency obligations under 
section 7 and summarizing three situations where these requirements have 
applied to USBR project operations. Part III explains the structure,  
purposes, and elements of four RIPs; examines some key differences  
between these programs and the usual ESA approach in the water context; 
and notes the success of these programs in legal terms. Part IV attempts to 
answer three broad questions about RIPs: why they have caught on in the 
western water context, whether they can actually recover species, and 
whether they are likely to become even more popular.  
I. FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES REGARDING WATER 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE WEST 
A. Federalism in Water Law 
Water law in the western United States is primarily state law, and the 
western states have generally allocated water under the doctrine of prior 
appropriation.24 This system recognizes water rights based on application of 
water to a “beneficial use,” and such rights last forever so long as they  
continue to be exercised;25 in times of shortage, the oldest water rights take 
priority over those established later.26 By providing secure entitlements to 
                                                                                                                      
 24. As the Western Governors Association recently stated, “States have the pivotal 
role in allocating, administering, protecting, and developing water resources . . . .” 
W. GOVERNORS ASS’N, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST 1 (2011), available 
at http://www.westgov.org/policies/doc_download/1441-11-7.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
The western states have striven to maintain primacy since the 1800s. See generally California 
v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653–70 (1978) (describing history of federal-state relations in 
western water law through the 1902 Reclamation Act, emphasizing the views of western 
states and congressmen regarding state control of water resources). The Western Governors 
Association remains fully committed to protecting state authority over water.  
 25. See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for 
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 920 (1998). 
 26. See A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. 
REV. 881, 881 (2000) (calling the principle of senior uses taking priority over junior uses 
“the central dogma of western water law”). 
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water use, western water law has sought to promote water development for 
productive uses such as irrigation, industry, and municipal water supply.27  
In managing water, however, the western states have been forced to 
share power with the federal government. Although the Supreme Court has 
stated that the history of western water law reveals a “consistent thread of 
purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress,”28 that 
remark is at best misleading about the significance of federal law in this 
context.29 In reality, federal law has limited state water allocation authority 
since at least 1899, when the Supreme Court upheld the power of the  
national government to block a new dam on the Rio Grande that had  
already been approved by New Mexico.30 While acknowledging that  
Congress had largely left water allocation in state hands, the Court affirmed 
federal power to protect navigation, and also declared that “a State cannot 
by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of 
lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters, so far, at least 
as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property.”31 
This latter statement foreshadowed the Court’s 1908 decision in Winters 
v. United States,32 holding that an Indian reservation in Montana had a water 
right based on federal law; the treaty establishing the Fort Belknap Reser-
vation said nothing about water, but the Court determined that an 
irrigation water right was necessary to fulfill the purposes of that treaty.33 
Winters established that the federal government could claim water rights for 
Indian reservations for the amount of water needed to serve the purpose(s) 
for which they were created.34 For decades it was thought that the Winters 
                                                                                                                      
 27. See Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 154 (1935) 
(explaining the western states’ choice of prior appropriation to provide water for manufac-
turing, irrigation, and mining purposes), 157–58 (declaring that the choice of prior 
appropriation allowed the West to develop, and “became the determining factor in the long 
struggle to expunge from our vocabulary the legend ‘Great American Desert,’ which was 
spread in large letters across the face of the old maps of the far west”). 
 28. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 653. 
 29. See David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal 
Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States’ Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6 (2001) (calling 
federal deference to state water law a “myth”); Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: 
National Interests vs. State Authority under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. 
REV. 241, 249 (“Congress and the Supreme Court have generally refused to cede control 
over water to the states if there was a potential conflict with an important national interest 
such as navigation, hydropower development, federal reclamation policy, or more recently, 
environmental protection.”). 
 30. United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). 
 31. Id. at 703. 
 32. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
 33. Id. at 576. 
 34. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597–600 (1963). 
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doctrine was limited to Indian country,35 but the Supreme Court signaled in 
1955 that it might extend to other federal lands designated for a particular 
purpose.36 The prospect of “federal reserved water rights” for tribal and 
federal lands raised serious concerns in the western states,37 both before and 
after the Supreme Court confirmed that the United States could claim 
them for national lands such as parks, forests, and wildlife refuges.38 Not 
only did federal water rights jeopardize state control over water allocation, 
they also threatened to disrupt existing water uses, because many Indian 
reservations and federal land designations predated water rights (for irriga-
tion and other uses) established under state law.39 
Even though the Winters doctrine provides a clear legal basis for federal 
water rights for federal and tribal lands, the western states have largely been 
able to minimize the practical impact of reserved right claims. A key reason 
for the states’ success is a series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting a 
federal statute known as the McCarran Amendment,40 and holding, in 
effect, that the purposes of this law are ordinarily best served by having 
federal and tribal water right claims heard in state courts.41 Since these 
cases, federal and tribal water claims have been heard almost exclusively in 
                                                                                                                      
 35. See Frank J. Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 473, 475 (1977) (stating that the author never heard it suggested before 1955 that the 
reserved rights doctrine applied to non-Indian lands). 
 36. Federal Power Comm’n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 446–47 (1955). 
 37. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976) (noting that bills had been 
introduced in Congress to require at least some federal water uses to obtain water rights 
exclusively under state law, but none had passed). Such bills are discussed extensively in Eva 
H. Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters—A Decade of Attempted “Clarifying 
Legislation,” 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 446–512 (1966). 
 38. Id. at 601. 
 39. See John E. Thorson, Ramsey L. Kropf, Andrea K. Gerlak and Dar Crammond, 
Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENV. 
WATER L. REV. 299, 306–12 (explaining concerns of western states and water users with 
potential implications of federal and tribal reserved rights). 
 40. This 1952 appropriations rider, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2006), waived federal 
sovereign immunity for the United States to be joined in general stream adjudications in 
state courts. These cases typically involve large numbers of water right claims in a particular 
stream system, and the McCarran Amendment was intended to allow federal claims to be 
heard in the same proceedings as private claims under state law. See Colorado River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 810–11 (1976) (discussing legislative 
history). The statute did not clearly address reserved right claims, however, and made no 
mention of U.S. claims on behalf of tribes. 
 41. For a fuller discussion of these cases, see Benson, supra note 2929, at 268–72;  
Thorson, supra note 39, at 334–37 (both summarizing and interpreting United States v. 
District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520 (1971); Colorado River Water Conser-
vation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); and Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 
463 U.S. 545 (1983)). 
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state courts,42 which are widely seen as less advantageous for such claims.43 
In reality, however, tribal reserved right claims have usually been resolved 
through settlement rather than litigation,44 typically following years of 
negotiations involving federal, tribal, and state representatives and some-
times other stakeholders too;45 these settlements have typically made 
significant sums of (mostly federal) money available to the tribes for water 
and economic development, and have also protected non-Indian water users 
from harm they may otherwise have faced from recognition of senior tribal 
rights.46 “Subordination” of senior tribal claims to existing (and sometimes 
even future) non-Indian uses can be a bitter pill for tribes to swallow,47 but 
it satisfies a top priority of states: ensuring certainty for their water users.48 
Even when they have turned to the national government for assis-
tance—in the form of federal water projects to supply water for irrigation 
and other purposes—the western states have sought to retain maximum 
authority over their water resources. Thus, when Congress enacted the 1902 
                                                                                                                      
 42. See Thorson et al., supra note 39, at 337 (stating that after these Supreme Court 
cases, western states launched water right adjudications “with the grim conviction that 
federal reserved [water] rights did in fact exist, a concern somewhat softened by the fact that 
most of these rights would be determined in a forum perceived to be more favorable: state 
court”). Only two states, Nevada and New Mexico, have significant water adjudications in 
federal court. Id. at 351, 361. 
 43. Id. at 337, 333 (noting that states feared adjudication of federal and tribal claims in 
federal courts, while federal and tribal attorneys feared state court adjudication); Michael C. 
Blumm, Reversing the Winters Doctrine? Denying Reserved Water Rights for Idaho Wilderness and 
Its Implications, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 173, 178 (2002) (asserting, in an article focusing on non-
tribal reserved right claims, that state courts “have proved largely hostile to reserved 
rights”); Michael C. Blumm, David H. Becker, and Joshua Smith, The Mirage of Indian 
Reserved Rights and Western Streamflow Restoration in the McCarran Amendment Era: A Promise 
Unfulfilled, 36 ENVTL. L. 1157, 1201 (2006) (“The six cases examined in this study reveal that 
. . . misgivings about states’ ability to provide a neutral forum for adjudicating tribal  
reserved water rights were well justified.”). 
 44. Jeanne S. Whiting, Indian Water Rights: The Era of Settlement, in THE FUTURE OF 
INDIAN AND FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS CENTENNIAL 136–37 
(Barbara Cosens & Judith V. Royster eds., 2012) (noting more than twenty tribal water right 
settlements between 1978 and 2008, but only two sets of tribal reserved rights determined 
through litigation in that time).  
 45. Id. at 139 (describing parties to reserved right settlement negotiations, and  
explaining federal participation). 
 46. Id. at 138 (describing benefits of settlement, including various ways to determine 
tribal rights “while also ameliorating impacts to existing water users”). 
 47. See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN 
LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 927 (6th ed. 2009). 
 48. Id. at 924 (“Non-Indian water users and state water administrators generally seek 
certainty of rights and maximum protection of existing uses, particularly by appropriators 
junior to the tribe whose interests are exposed in litigation.”). Federal officials, too, may 
want to see existing users protected. Id. (“The federal government seeks to mollify political 
constituencies allied with non-Indians and state authorities, but within the constraints of its 
trust responsibility to the tribes.”). 
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Reclamation Act49 authorizing the U.S. Department of the Interior (Interior) 
to construct irrigation projects in the West, it included a provision recogniz-
ing state water laws and water rights, and requiring the federal government 
“to proceed in conformity with such laws” in carrying out the program.50 
Thus, the states largely retained their role controlling water allocation and 
use, even as water development in the West increasingly was driven by 
Congress and the USBR.  
B. Federal Reclamation Projects and Their Operations 
The Reclamation Act authorized the Interior Secretary to build “irriga-
tion works for the storage, diversion, and development of waters”51 in the 
western states and territories. As originally conceived, these projects would 
supply irrigation water to farmers who would settle on designated lands and 
“reclaim” them for irrigated agriculture, repaying the government’s  
construction costs over a ten-year period.52 The USBR’s influence grew, 
however, as the reclamation program expanded to serve new purposes. By 
1939, Congress had recognized that reclamation projects could serve multi-
ple purposes, including hydropower, flood control, navigation, municipal 
water supply, and other “miscellaneous purposes.”53 Historian Donald  
Pisani wrote that the “High Dam Era” of the 1930s, with its large multi-
purpose projects, made the USBR “the most important federal agency in 
the West. From 1930 to 1970 the water and power provided by the bureau 
transformed the region . . . .”54 Today, reclamation projects deliver irriga-
tion water to 10 million acres and one-fifth of the West’s farmers, generate 
enough hydropower to serve 3.5 million homes, provide municipal water 
                                                                                                                      
 49. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified at scattered sections of 
43 U.S.C. from §§ 371–498). 
 50. This requirement is found in section 8 of the 1902 Act, (codified at 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 372, 383 (2006)). Western states and water users had pushed for even greater state 
control of the federal reclamation program. See DONALD J. PISANI, TO RECLAIM A DIVIDED 
WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1848-1902 at 298–319 (1992) (explaining efforts 
of western members of Congress to enact a federal irrigation program that would be  
controlled by the states rather than the national government). 
 51. Act of June 17, 1902 § 2 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 411 (2006)). 
 52. Id. §§ 4–5. 
 53. Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9(a), 53 Stat. 1187, 1193 (1939)  
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 485h(a) (2006)). Well before 1939, however, Congress was already 
authorizing reclamation projects for multiple purposes; for example, the Boulder Canyon 
Project Act authorized construction of Boulder (Hoover) Dam for purposes of river regulation, 
improvement of navigation, flood control, “irrigation and domestic uses, and satisfaction of 
present perfected rights,” and also provided for hydropower development at the dam. Act of 
December 21, 1928, ch. 42, § 6, 45 Stat. 1057, 1061. 
 54. Donald J. Pisani, Federal Reclamation Law in the Twentieth Century: A Centennial 
Retrospective, in THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: HISTORY ESSAYS FROM THE CENTENNIAL 
SYMPOSIUM VOLUMES I AND II 611, 611 (2008). 
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supplies serving 31 million people, and provide 90 million visitor-days of 
recreation.55  
From the beginning, the USBR was to manage and operate project  
reservoirs,56 and today it operates nearly 350 of them57 in seventeen western 
states.58 The operation of a particular project is governed largely by the 
statute(s) authorizing that project, and by the contracts under which the 
project supplies water for certain uses.59 Authorizing statutes specify 
(among other things) the purposes for which the project is to be constructed 
and operated, such as irrigation, hydropower, and recreation.60 The specific 
water supply obligations of a project are governed by contracts between the 
USBR and an entity such as an irrigation district or a municipality,61 which 
in turn delivers the water to end users such as irrigators or homeowners.  
Operation of these reservoirs, however, creates a variety of serious and 
ongoing environmental impacts throughout the West. Most notably, reser-
voir operations change the quantity, quality, and timing of downstream river 
flows, often damaging aquatic ecosystems and harming native species.62 
                                                                                                                      
 55. Bureau of Reclamation-About Us, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/index.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). 
 56. Act of June 17, 1902 § 6 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 498 (2006)). 
 57. Bureau of Reclamation Facts & Information, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/fact.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). 
 58. The seventeen Reclamation states are the six Great Plains states from North 
Dakota down to Texas, the three West Coast states, and the eight states of the Interior West. 
43 U.S.C. § 391 (2006). 
 59. For a general overview of these arrangements governing reclamation project 
water, see Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? Private Rights and Public Authority over Recla-
mation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 363 (1997). 
 60. For example, Congress authorized the multipurpose Washita Basin Project in 
Oklahoma 
for the principal purposes of storing, regulating, and furnishing water for municipal, 
domestic, and industrial use, and, for the irrigation of approximately twenty-six 
thousand acres of land and of controlling floods and, as incidents to the foregoing 
for the additional purposes of regulating the flow of the Washita River, providing 
for the preservation and propagation of fish and wildlife, and of enhancing  
recreational opportunities. 
Act of February 25, 1956, ch. 71, § 1, 70 Stat. 28.  
 61. See 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS § 41.05(c) (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley 
eds., 3rd ed. 2009) (discussing the Bureau’s water delivery obligations under its water supply 
contracts). 
 62. Richter and Thomas summarize the typical downstream effects of dams (not 
necessary Bureau dams) as follows: 
Of all the environmental changes wrought by dam construction and operation, the 
alteration of natural water flow regimes has had the most pervasive and damaging 
effects on river ecosystems and species (Poff et al. 1997, Postel and Richter 2003). 
Below we discuss the ways that dam operations induce hydrologic changes, the  
nature of which is strongly influenced by the operating purposes of the dam. 
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Indeed, a 1996 study of counties in the western United States “found that 
the number of ESA-listed fish species in a county correlated positively with 
the level of irrigated agriculture reliant on surface water in the county. In 
particular, the number of species depended positively on water-supply 
levels of the Bureau of Reclamation.”63 In other words, the more water 
delivered by USBR projects in a particular area, the more threatened or 
endangered fish species in that area. This correlation between reclamation 
projects and listed species has made the ESA an increasingly major factor in 
USBR’s operations, as discussed in the next section. 
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND ITS APPLICATION TO 
FEDERAL WATER PROJECTS 
Enacted in 1973, the ESA is one of the nation’s most important and 
controversial environmental laws. The ESA’s purpose is to conserve endan-
gered and threatened species64 and the ecosystems on which they depend.65 
As the Supreme Court stated, “[E]xamination of the language, history, and 
structure of the legislation . . . indicates beyond doubt that Congress  
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.”66 All 
federal agencies have ESA duties, but the two most responsible for deter-
                                                                                                                      
Dams can heavily modify the volume of water flowing downstream, change the 
timing, frequency, and duration of high and low flows, and alter the natural rates 
at which rivers rise and fall during runoff events. Although much has been written 
about the ecological consequences of hydrologic alteration, Bunn and Arthington 
(2002) summarize their review of this literature by highlighting four primary eco-
logical impacts associated with flow alteration: (1) because river flow shapes 
physical habitats such as riffles, pools, and bars in rivers and floodplains, and 
thereby determines biotic composition, flow alteration can lead to severely modi-
fied channel and floodplain habitats; (2) aquatic species have evolved life history 
strategies, such as their timing of reproduction, in direct response to natural flow 
regimes, which can be de-synchronized through flow alteration; (3) many species 
are highly dependent upon lateral and longitudinal hydraulic connectivity, which 
can be broken through flow alteration; and (4) the invasion of exotic and intro-
duced species in river systems can be facilitated by flow alteration. 
Brian D. Richter & Gregory A. Thomas, Restoring Environmental Flows by Modifying Dam 
Operations, 12(1) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 12 (2007), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/ 
vol12/iss1/art12 (last visited Sept. 16, 2010). 
 63. Michael R. Moore et al., Water Allocation in the American West: Endangered Fish 
Versus Irrigated Agriculture, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 319, 348 (1996). 
 64. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2006). The ESA defines an endangered species as one that is 
“in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range,” id. § 1532(6), 
while a threatened species is one that is “likely to become an endangered species within the 
foreseeable future.” Id. § 1532(20). Through rules issued under section 4(d) of the ESA, id. 
§ 1533(d), the law typically applies equally to both types of species. 
 65. Id. § 1531(b). 
 66. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978). 
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mining the status and needs of imperiled species are the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) within the Interior, and for oceangoing species 
such as salmon, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) within the 
Department of Commerce (together, “the Services”). 
A. Key Provisions of the ESA 
1. Section 4: Species Listing and Recovery Planning 
Section 4 of the ESA largely deals with decisions regarding the listing 
of species as threatened or endangered.67 The statute requires the FWS or 
NMFS to make such decisions through notice-and-comment rulemaking,68 
“solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available.”69 
Section 4 also calls on the relevant Service to designate critical habitat70 for 
each species at the time of listing,71 using the same process and the same 
information as in listing decisions, but also “taking into consideration the 
economic impact, the impact on national security, and any other relevant 
impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat.”72 Thus,  
section 4 requires the relevant Service to determine which species, and 
which habitat for these species, require protection. 
In addition, ESA section 4(f) requires the relevant Service “to develop 
and implement plans . . . for the conservation and survival” of listed  
species.73 Such recovery plans must contain site-specific management  
actions for the conservation and survival of the species, specific criteria for 
de-listing the species, and estimates of the time and money required to 
carry out the identified measures.74 No rulemaking process is required, 
although the relevant Service must provide for public notice and comment 
before adopting a recovery plan, and must consider all information provided 
during the comment period.75  
Although the statute mandates that the relevant Service “develop and 
implement” recovery plans,76 the plans themselves have limited legal signif-
                                                                                                                      
 67. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006). 
 68. Id. § 1533(a)(1), 1533(b)(4). 
 69. Id. § 1533(b)(1). 
 70. The statute defines critical habitat in some detail, but the key requirement is that 
the habitat be “essential for the conservation of the species.” Id. § 1532(5). 
 71. The requirement for critical habitat designation at the time of listing is not 
absolute. See id. 1533(b)(6)(C). 
 72. Id. § 1533(b)(2). 
 73. Id. § 1533(f)(1). This requirement applies unless the Service determines that a 
plan would not promote the conservation of the species. Id. 
 74. Id. § 1533(f)(1)(B). 
 75. Id. § 1533(f)(4). 
 76. Id. § 1533(f)(1).  
Benson_Final_Printer_Ready_FINAL_12June2013 7/18/2013 4:21 PM 
486 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:2 
icance. As Federico Cheever wrote in his thorough 1996 analysis of the role 
and significance of recovery plans, section 4(f) “does not require that recovery 
plans have the force of law or that the duties they impose bind federal  
agencies or anyone else.”77 And while Cheever argued for a greater focus on 
recovery and recovery planning in ESA implementation,78 he acknowledged 
that the courts had generally been unwilling to find such plans directly 
enforceable.79 The Services’ recovery planning guidance clearly states that 
recovery plans are nonbinding, but they provide the “central organizing tool 
for guiding each species’ recovery process.”80 
Section 4(f) allows the relevant Services to appoint “recovery teams” 
involving “appropriate public and private agencies and institutions, and 
other qualified persons” for purposes of developing and implementing 
recovery plans.81 The statute itself says little else about recovery teams, 
leaving the Secretary with great discretion regarding the formation and 
composition of a recovery team for a particular species.82 The Services’ 
recovery planning guidance offers far more detail, identifying circumstances 
where recovery teams may be appropriate,83 and listing both the  
advantages84 and disadvantages85 of recovery teams. This guidance suggests 
that recovery teams should not always be used; by contrast, the Services 
have a longstanding policy of seeking state agency involvement in recovery 
plan development and, especially, implementation.86 
                                                                                                                      
 77. Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endan-
gered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 59 (1996). 
 78. Id. at 72–75. 
 79. Id. at 59–63 (discussing and citing three cases holding recovery plans unenforceable). 
 80. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV. & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., INTERIM 
ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES RECOVERY PLANNING GUIDANCE VERSION 1.3, 
§ 1.1.1 (2010) [hereinafter RECOVERY PLANNING GUIDANCE]. 
 81. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(2) (2006).  
 82. In the absence of a recovery team, a recovery plan may be prepared by Service 
biologists or by a contractor. RECOVERY PLANNING GUIDANCE, supra note 80, at §§ 2.3.2.2, 
2.3.2.3. 
 83. “Recovery teams are often appropriate for more wide-ranging species, more 
controversial issues, and larger-scope plans.” Id. at Box 2.3.2.4. 
 84. Listed advantages include, among others, “increase the depth of expertise (biological 
and otherwise) contributing to plan development,” “address and resolve controversial issues 
early in the process,” and “facilitate the implementation of recovery actions.” Id. § 2.3.2.4. 
 85. Listed disadvantages include, among others, “a tendency for unwieldy and non-
productive meetings,” “difficulties bridging knowledge gaps among scientists, agency 
representatives, and other stakeholders,” and “more complications in recovery plan development 
due to diverse viewpoints and sheer number of opinions.” Id. 
 86. The policy calls for the Services to “[u]tilize the expertise and solicit the  
information and participation of State agencies” in developing and implementing recovery 
plans. As to implementation, the policy continues, “State agencies have the capabilities to 
carry out many of the actions identified in recovery plans and are in an excellent position to 
do so because of their close working relationships with local governments and landowners.” 
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2. Section 7: Consultation on Federal Actions to  
Avoid Jeopardizing Species 
ESA section 7 imposes special obligations, both substantive and  
procedural, on federal agencies.87 Most important is section 7(a)(2), which 
commands that every federal agency “shall . . . insure that any action  
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to  
jeopardize the continued existence” of any threatened species, or adversely 
modify its designated critical habitat.88 The statute does not define the 
crucial “jeopardy” term, but under the ESA implementing rules, the term 
means “to engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly 
or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and 
recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, num-
bers, or distribution of that species.”89 The Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill 
declared that this provision showed “beyond doubt that Congress intended 
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.”90 Although this 
case may have been the ESA’s high water mark (at least in the Supreme 
Court),91 the jeopardy prohibition of section 7 has remained one of the 
strongest standards in environmental law. 
Section 7(a)(2) couples the substantive standard of “no jeopardy” with 
the mandatory process of “consultation.”92 The Ninth Circuit has explained 
the consultation triggers and process as follows: 
In order to ensure compliance with the Act, the ESA and its  
implementing regulations require federal agencies (“action agencies”) 
to consult with the appropriate federal fish and wildlife agency . . . 
whenever their actions “may affect an endangered or threatened 
species.” Thus, if the agency determines that a particular action will 
have no effect on an endangered or threatened species, the consul-
tation requirements are not triggered. If the action agency 
subsequently determines that its action is “likely to adversely  
affect” a protected species, it must engage in formal consultation. 
Formal consultation requires that the consulting agency . . . issue a 
                                                                                                                      
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Interagency Policy Regarding Role of 
State Agencies in ESA Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,274, 34,275, E.1, E.2 (Jul. 1, 1994)  
[hereinafter ESA state agency policy]. 
 87. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006).  
 88. Id. § 1536(a)(2).  
 89. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2012). 
 90. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978). 
 91. See J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act’s Fall from Grace in the Supreme Court, 36 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 487, 490 (2012) (“Hill has become the extreme outlier in the Court’s 
ESA jurisprudence.”). 
 92. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
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biological opinion determining whether the action is likely to  
jeopardize the listed species and describing, if necessary, reasonable 
and prudent alternatives that will avoid a likelihood of jeopardy.93  
Section 7(a)(2) requires federal agencies to use the best available commercial 
and scientific data in carrying out its requirements,94 and does not provide 
for consideration of economic factors.95 Under an ESA implementing rule, 
however, section 7 applies only to “discretionary” federal actions.96 
If the FWS determines in its Biological Opinion (BO) that the  
proposed action may jeopardize the species or impair critical habitat, it 
must suggest a “reasonable and prudent alternative” (RPA) to avoid jeopardy 
while meeting the purposes of the proposal.97 The ESA implementing rules 
define RPAs as “alternative actions identified during formal consultation 
that can be implemented in a manner consistent with the intended purposes 
of the action,” that are within the action agency’s authority and jurisdiction, 
that are “economically and technologically feasible, and that the Director 
believes would avoid the likelihood” of jeopardizing the species or impairing 
critical habitat.98 The rules provide that a “jeopardy” BO must include an 
RPA unless the FWS is unable to identify one.99  
Although they say little about the required content of RPAs, the rules 
provide some detail about the process of developing them. First, they  
require the FWS to “discuss” the availability of an RPA with the action 
agency, along with any applicant seeking approval from that agency.100 
Second, they state that the FWS “will utilize the expertise” of the action 
                                                                                                                      
 93. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted). 
 94. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
 95. By contrast, designation of critical habitat requires use of the best available scien-
tific data, but also consideration of economic impacts, national security impacts, and other 
relevant impacts associated with designating a particular area. Id. § 1533(b)(2). 
 96. “Section 7 and the requirements of this part [of the ESA implementing rules] 
apply to all actions in which there is discretionary federal involvement or control.” 50 C.F.R. 
§ 402.03 (2012); see Reed D. Benson, Dams, Duties, and Discretion: Bureau of Reclamation 
Water Project Operations and the Endangered Species Act, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3-4 (2008) 
(explaining the Supreme Court case upholding this rule, and analyzing its implications for 
USBR project operations). 
 97. 16 U.S.C. § 1632(b)(3)(A) (2006). 
 98. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2012). 
 99. Id. § 402.14(h)(3). The ESA implementing rules further provide that after a BO is 
issued, the action agency “shall determine whether and in what manner to proceed with the 
action in light of its section 7 obligations and the Service’s biological opinion,” and shall 
notify the Service of its final decision. Id. § 402.15. 
 100. Id. § 402.14(g)(5). The rules define “applicant” as any person “who requires 
formal approval or authorization from a federal agency as a prerequisite to conducting the 
action.” Id. § 402.02. 
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agency and any applicant in identifying RPAs.101 Third, they require the 
FWS to make its draft BO available to the action agency upon request, to 
allow the agency to analyze the RPA(s); the agency may then provide 
comments to the FWS.102 Finally, they provide that in formulating the BO, 
including any RPAs, the FWS “will give appropriate consideration to any 
beneficial actions taken by the Federal agency or applicant, including any 
actions taken prior to the initiation of consultation.”103 
Thus, the consultation rules contemplate participation by three entities: 
the FWS, the action agency, and the applicant (if any). Unlike species 
listing determinations under section 4, there is no notice-and-comment 
process that offers an opportunity for stakeholders or interested citizens to 
participate.104 And in contrast to the development and implementation of 
recovery plans, there is no general policy providing for participation by 
state agencies in the consultation process or the development of RPAs.105 
3. Provisions Regarding “Take” of Listed Animals 
Once a species is listed as threatened or endangered, section 9 of the 
ESA prohibits “take” of any member of a protected species of fish or wild-
life.106 This prohibition applies to “any person,”107 and the ESA defines 
“person” to include virtually any conceivable entity, including a federal 
agency.108 Under the ESA, “ ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any 
such conduct.”109 FWS by rule has defined “harm” in this context to include 
“significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or 
injures wildlife,”110 thus bringing some habitat destruction within the  
prohibition of take.111  
                                                                                                                      
 101. Id. § 402.14(g)(5).  
 102. Id. The applicant may request a copy of the draft BO from the action agency, and 
may submit comments on the BO. Id.  
 103. Id. § 402.14(g)(8). 
 104. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(4) (2006) (requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures for most listing decisions). 
 105. The Services have a policy of seeking information from state agencies in the  
process of developing BOs. ESA state agency policy, supra note 86, at 34,275, C.1, C.2. In 
the recovery planning context, however, the policy calls on the Services to seek participation 
as well as information from state agencies, and to utilize their expertise. Id. at E.1, E.2. 
 106. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 107. Id. § 1538(a)(1). 
 108. Id. § 1532(13). 
 109. Id. § 1532(19). 
 110. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2012). 
 111. The Supreme Court upheld this rule in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Commu-
nities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). Under ESA section 10, the Services may issue 
an Incidental Take Permit to a non-federal entity, allowing legalized “take” of protected 
species where the take would be “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an 
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A federal agency action may incidentally result in a taking of a member 
of a listed species, but if the agency has followed the requirements of section 7 
with respect to that action, it receives an “incidental take statement” from 
the relevant Service authorizing a certain level of take in connection with 
that action.112 The incidental take statement must specify the impact of the 
anticipated take on the species, along with “those reasonable and prudent 
measures that the Secretary considers necessary or appropriate to address 
such impact.”113 It also prescribes binding terms and conditions for  
implementing these reasonable and prudent measures.114 
For non-federal actions, the ESA provides a different means of author-
izing incidental take of listed animals. Under section 10, the Secretary may 
issue an incidental take permit115 to an applicant that has submitted a  
conservation plan for a particular activity, specifying the measures the 
applicant will take to minimize harm to the species.116 Before issuing the 
permit, the Secretary essentially must find that the incidental taking will 
not cause jeopardy to the listed species117 and that the applicant will mini-
mize and mitigate harm to the species to the greatest extent practicable.118 
While all of these provisions are relevant to the water resources  
context, many of the biggest endangered species controversies have arisen 
from the application of section 7 to the operation of federal water projects, 
and the next Section discusses three river basins where ESA compliance 
became a major issue.  
                                                                                                                      
otherwise lawful activity.” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2006). The applicant for such an 
incidental take permit must submit a conservation plan, better known as a habitat conservation 
plan (HCP), describing (among other things) the applicant’s steps to mitigate or minimize 
take and the funding available for these efforts. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
 112. Id. § 1536(b)(4); see Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 
782, 790 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 113. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(i)–(ii) (2006). 
 114. Id. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(iv) (incidental take statement “sets forth the terms and condi-
tions . . . that must be complied with by the Federal agency or applicant (if any), or both, to 
implement the measures specified . . . .”). 
 115. Section 10 allows the Secretary to issue certain types of permits, “under such 
terms and conditions as he shall prescribe.” Id. § 1539(a)(1). One such permit allows taking 
of listed animals that would otherwise be prohibited by section 9, “if such taking is  
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” Id. 
§ 1539(a)(1)(B). 
 116. Such a plan must also identify funding sources available for mitigation, alternative 
actions considered by the applicant, and other measures as the Secretary may identify. Id. 
§ 1539(a)(2)(A). 
 117. The statute does not use the term “jeopardy” here, but requires a finding that the 
incidental taking “will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of 
the species in the wild.” Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv). This language matches the key portion of 
the jeopardy definition in the ESA implementing rules. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2012). 
 118. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii). Section 10 requires other findings as well, including 
adequate funding for the plan. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iii). 
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B. Section 7 and USBR Projects: Three Examples 
One reason why the ESA has generated such heated disputes in the  
water context is that it operates so differently from western state water law, 
which recognizes property rights in water use and gives top priority to the 
oldest ones.119 The ESA does not itself create or obtain water rights for the 
flows needed to protect species, but instead operates as a regulatory overlay 
on the legal system for water allocation and management.120 The ESA does 
not eliminate or directly restrict water rights, but it can limit their exercise 
as needed to avoid a take of listed species,121 or jeopardy caused by federal 
water management actions.122 If water use is restricted for purposes of 
maintaining adequate flows for listed species, the ESA does not necessarily 
limit junior users (as state law would), but rather may trump appropriative 
rights to curtail the uses most directly responsible for causing harm.123 
Because section 7 imposes special duties on federal agencies, the most  
vulnerable water uses under the ESA are those with a federal nexus—most 
notably, those who receive water from a federal project.124 
In order to show how RIPs differ from the usual modus operandi in their 
approach to section 7 compliance, this Section discusses three “standard” 
consultations on the operation of USBR water projects. Each of the resulting 
BOs was challenged in court, and this Section draws from the published 
                                                                                                                      
 119. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text. 
 120. See, e.g., Cnty. of Okanogan v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (rejecting challenge to restrictions on irrigation diversions, imposed through 
consultation on permits for ditches crossing federal lands; court noted that the issue was one 
of federal regulatory power rather than water rights). 
 121. “The Act provides no exemption from compliance to persons possessing state 
water rights . . . .” United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 
(E.D. Cal. 1992) (enjoining irrigation diversions by district, which had improperly screened 
pumps that were killing and injuring listed salmon in violation of the section 9 take  
prohibition). 
 122. See, e.g., Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1201 (D. Or. 2001) (rejecting 
claims by irrigators that they had legal rights to the water from the Klamath Project despite 
the USBR’s need to avoid jeopardy in operating the project; the court stated that “as recog-
nized by this court and the Ninth Circuit, plaintiffs’ contract rights to irrigation water are 
subservient to ESA and tribal trust requirements”).  
 123. See David E. Filippi, The Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Water Rights and 
Water Use, 48 PROC. ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22–1, 22–11, 22–25 (2002) (describing how 
ESA restrictions on water use to protect listed species in the Walla Walla River conflicted 
with water right priorities under state law). 
 124. Some federal project water users have sued for compensation, arguing that they 
have lost water due to ESA restrictions and claiming a breach of contract and/or a taking of 
property rights. The results have been mixed, and several of the leading cases are still being 
litigated. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443 (2011). See generally Douglas L. 
Grant, ESA Reductions in Reclamation of Water Contract Deliveries: A Fifth Amendment Taking 
of Property?, 36 ENVTL. L. 1331 (2006). 
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opinions in these cases to explain both the consultation and the resulting 
litigation. It concludes with a brief discussion of subsequent developments, 
as negotiations followed litigation in all three river basins.  
1. Lower Colorado 
Lake Mead, at the end of the Grand Canyon, is one of the most  
important federal reservoirs, providing major water supply and hydropower 
benefits for the Lower Colorado River Basin states (the “Lower Basin 
states”) of Arizona, California, and Nevada.125 The USBR operates Lake 
Mead (Hoover Dam) in accordance with the “Law of the River,” an exten-
sive set of compacts, statutes, court decrees, and treaties governing the 
allocation of the Colorado River’s limited and highly variable water  
supplies.126 The USBR’s operations on the Lower Colorado may affect a 
number of listed species,127 but the original ESA dispute over Lake Mead 
operations focused on the southwestern willow flycatcher; as its name  
implies, the flycatcher occupies willow habitat, and disappearance of such 
habitat along southwestern rivers was a major reason the species was listed 
in 1995.128 
As a result of several dry years in the Colorado River Basin, however, 
new flycatcher habitat appeared in a precarious place: the Lake Mead delta, 
at the upper end of the reservoir. Low lake levels allowed willows to grow 
up in the temporarily dry lakebed, and they eventually took over 1,148 
acres, representing “the second largest continuous patch of native willow 
habitat known to exist in the Southwest.”129 By the mid-1990s, however, 
wetter weather allowed the USBR to refill the reservoir, causing destruction 
of the willow habitat and “take” of flycatchers occupying these trees.130 
After the USBR submitted its biological assessment in 1996, FWS de-
livered a draft BO concluding that project operations on the Lower 
                                                                                                                      
 125. These benefits include providing irrigation water for 2.4 million acres in California, 
Arizona, and Mexico, and municipal water supply for a population of over 20 million in the 
Lower Basin states (Arizona, California, Nevada). Hoover Dam is also one of the world’s 
largest producers of hydropower. Boulder Canyon Project—Hoover Dam, U.S. BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Boulder%20Canyon 
%20Project%20-%20Hoover%20Dam (last visited Sept. 18, 2012). 
 126. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE COLORADO RIVER DOCUMENTS 2008 
xxxvii–xli, 1-1 to 1-6 (2010). 
 127. See id. at 3-11 to 3-13 (identifying species affected by Lower Colorado operations 
including various fish species, the Yuma clapper rail, Southwestern willow flycatcher, and 
flat-tailed horned lizard). 
 128. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Rule Determining Endangered Status for 
the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,694, 10,707 (Feb. 27, 1995). 
 129. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515, 517 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
 130. Id. 
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Colorado for the next five years would cause jeopardy to the flycatcher. 
This draft BO found that loss of the willow habitat in the Lake Mead Delta 
could prove catastrophic, and emphasized the need to protect this existing 
habitat from inundation. The RPA that FWS issued required the USBR, 
among other things, “to use the full scope of its authority and discretion to 
immediately protect and maintain the 1148 acres of riparian habitat” in the 
lakebed—essentially blocking the re-filling of Lake Mead. If the USBR 
could not protect the Lake Mead habitat, it had to preserve habitat at a 
nearby reservoir, Lake Roosevelt, by temporarily filling the lake no higher 
than an elevation of 2,136 feet.131 As of January 1997, FWS believed that 
jeopardy to the flycatcher could not be avoided without these measures.132 
After receiving the draft BO for comment, the USBR pushed back,  
insisting it had limited discretion in operating Lake Mead and could not 
avoid refilling the reservoir to protect flycatchers.133 FWS deferred to the 
USBR on this point, and in the final BO it no longer required protection of 
the existing habitat at Lake Mead, or the fallback habitat at Lake Roosevelt. 
Instead, the FWS produced a new RPA relying on a short-term program of 
acquiring and protecting about 1,400 acres of currently unprotected  
habitat—preferably (but not necessarily) habitat already occupied by  
flycatchers. All of the habitat had to be protected by 2001 (with the first 
500 acres by 1999), but the RPA did not specify any particular parcels of 
habitat, or require any of it to be established before the Lake Mead Delta 
habitat was wiped out.134 The RPA did call for additional long-term 
measures, however, including provision of additional habitat and continued 
development of a “Multi-Species Conservation Program” for the Lower 
Colorado River.135  
                                                                                                                      
 131. The USBR had to defer using the Lake Roosevelt storage space above 2,136 feet 
“until suitable flycatcher habitat could be developed elsewhere.” Id. at 518. Lake Roosevelt, 
northeast of Phoenix, is part of the USBR’s Salt River Project. Salt River Project, U.S. 
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Salt%20 
River%20Project&pageType=ProjectPage (last updated Aug. 19, 2011). 
 132. Sw. Center for Biological Diversity, 143 F.3d at 518. 
 133. The USBR took the position that it could lower Lake Mead only for purposes of 
river regulation, improvement of navigation, flood control, irrigation, domestic uses, and 
power production. Id. This position prevailed in a later case involving the Lower Colorado 
River, as the court held that the “Law of the River” left the USBR with no discretion to 
operate its projects for the benefit of ESA-listed species located in Mexico. See Defenders of 
Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 53, 69 (D.D.C. 2003). Because section 7 applies only to 
discretionary federal actions, the scope of the USBR’s discretion in project operations is 
crucial for purposes of determining the nature and extent of the agency’s ESA duties. See 
Benson, supra note 96, at 32–55. 
 134. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 143 F.3d at 518. 
 135. Id. at 518–19. The Multi-Species Conservation Program is discussed infra at notes 
197–207 and accompanying text. 
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The Southwest Center for Biological Diversity filed suit to protect the 
Lake Mead Delta habitat, arguing that the USBR’s operations were violating 
the ESA and that the RPA was arbitrary and capricious. The district court 
granted summary judgment to the government on the RPA claim, rejecting 
arguments that the RPA failed to avoid jeopardy;136 the court upheld the 
RPA despite the flycatcher’s “precarious status”137 even though the final 
RPA was far weaker than the draft in requiring protection of existing fly-
catcher habitat.138 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit had little trouble upholding 
the district court, and explained that the ESA imposes few requirements on 
RPA selection: 
[T]he Secretary was not required to pick the first reasonable  
alternative the FWS came up with in formulating the RPA. The 
Secretary was not even required to pick the best alternative or the 
one that would most effectively protect the Flycatcher from  
jeopardy. The Secretary need only have adopted a final RPA which 
complied with the jeopardy standard and which could be imple-
mented by the agency. 
Secondly, under the ESA, the Secretary was not required to explain 
why he chose one RPA over another, or to justify his decision based 
solely on apolitical factors. Accordingly, the district court had no 
reason to address the possible factors that might have motivated 
the Secretary in rejecting the draft RPA or to address the merits of 
Southwest’s argument that the Secretary improperly rejected the 
draft RPA based on Reclamation’s bare assertion that it lacked the 
discretion to lower the water level at Lake Mead.139 
The court went on to uphold the district court’s determination, based on 
the record, that the final RPA satisfied these requirements.140 Thus, Southwest 
Center shows that the government has vast discretion in choosing an RPA, 
so long as it can make and support a finding of no jeopardy. 
2. Klamath 
The Klamath River Basin straddles the Oregon–California line, and the 
USBR’s Klamath Project delivers water for irrigation in both states.  
                                                                                                                      
 136. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Reclamation, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 
1129, 1134 (D. Ariz. 1997). 
 137. Id. at 1131. 
 138. Id. at 1128–31, 1133. 
 139. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 143 F.3d at 523 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 140. Id. (explaining the rationale in support of the FWS finding of no jeopardy, and 
stating that the plaintiff had provided no convincing evidence to the contrary). 
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Operation of this project, along with hydropower dams and non-project 
irrigation,141 has dramatically altered the Klamath Basin ecosystem to the 
detriment of several types of fish. Two species of suckers were listed under 
the ESA in 1988, followed by coho salmon in the Klamath River in 1997.142 
These listings effectively put the squeeze on Klamath Project operations, 
because the suckers need certain water levels for their habitat in Upper 
Klamath Lake—the main source of irrigation water storage for the project—
while the salmon require releases from the lake to provide adequate flows to 
maintain habitat and water temperatures in the Klamath River. 
The USBR began consulting in the early 1990s on annual operating 
plans for the Klamath Project, but because the latter part of that decade was 
relatively wet, the project was able to meet fish habitat requirements without 
reducing irrigation deliveries.143 The good times ended in 2000, however, as 
the weather turned abruptly dry that summer and remained so through the 
winter.144 By early 2001, the USBR was facing both a historic drought in 
the Klamath Basin, and a court order to complete consultation before  
delivering irrigation water from the project. The resulting BOs divided 
nearly all of the year’s limited water supplies between the lake (for suckers) 
and the river (for salmon), leaving none for most Project irrigators.145 The 
decision brought loud protests, both from the farming communities of the 
Klamath Basin (where some people engaged in civil disobedience) and from 
politicians sympathetic to their plight.146 
The following year, the USBR produced a new ten-year operating plan 
for the Klamath Project, and consultation on this plan with the NMFS 
resulted in a ten-year BO regarding impacts on coho salmon.147 The USBR 
had essentially proposed to release enough water to replicate recent average 
flows in the Klamath River, and also develop a “water bank” to provide up 
to an additional 100,000 acre-feet of water to be dedicated to salmon.148 The 
BO found that project operations would cause jeopardy to the coho, and 
provided an RPA to avoid that result. The RPA specified the Klamath 
                                                                                                                      
 141. See Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin 
Water and the Endangered Species Act, 15 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 197, 201–09 (2002). 
 142. Id. at 216–18. 
 143. Id. at 218–20. 
 144. Id. at 221–22. 
 145. Id. at 223–27.  
 146. Id. at 198–99, 228. 
 147. The new operating plan was based partly on a 2002 report by the National  
Research Council, finding a lack of scientific support for the flow recommendations of the 
2001 BO on the effect of Klamath Project operations on salmon. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of 
Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 148. The average flow varied by water year type, so the average flow for a dry water 
year would be lower than for a wet year, and the USBR’s biological assessment proposed to 
provide similar flows based on the year type. Id. at 1088.  
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River flows needed to avoid jeopardy, based on coho habitat requirements 
and the need to maintain suitable summer water temperatures.149 For the 
first eight of the ten years, however, the RPA allowed flows in the river to 
be significantly lower; for the period from 2006–2010, flows could be as low 
as 57% of the long-term requirements.150 The gap between the flows salmon 
need, and the flows the project would provide, reflected the RPA’s “organizing 
principle” that the USBR should be responsible for no more than its share 
of overall water use in the Klamath Basin. “Because the project irrigates 57 
percent of the land in the basin, the RPA provided that the BOR would 
provide 57 percent of the water needed for the coho, and establish an inter-
governmental workgroup to ‘develop the other 43 [percent] of the flows.’ ”151 
Fishing and conservation groups challenged the Klamath Project BO, 
and the courts rejected two of its key features.152 First, the RPA provision 
allowing the USBR to provide only 57% of the necessary Klamath River 
flows was held to be arbitrary and capricious. The district court found that 
the NMFS had improperly relied on “actions that were ‘not reasonably 
certain to occur’ when it determined that the coho would receive 100  
percent of the flows through a collaborative process.”153 But the district 
court upheld the RPA’s phased approach, even though it effectively ensured 
that flows would fall well below the specified long-term levels for the first 
eight years of the ten-year period.154 
The Ninth Circuit reversed on this latter point, finding that the BO 
had not adequately explained its conclusion that the coho would not be 
jeopardized as a result of eight years of flows lower than those deemed 
necessary for the species’ long-term survival. Seeing no analysis to support 
this conclusion, the court rejected the NMFS’s argument that the BO  
reflected the agency’s expert judgment in an area where the science was 
uncertain.155 The court found that the RPA laid out a clear rationale for the 
long-term flow requirements, but no rationale for why salmon would not be 
                                                                                                                      
 149. Id. at 1089. 
 150. Id. at 1088–89. 
 151. Id. at 1088. 
 152. The district court upheld the determination of long-term flow needs for coho, 
however, and the plaintiffs did not appeal on this point. See id. at 1089. 
 153. See id. There was no appeal on this point, but the Ninth Circuit stated, “The 
proper baseline analysis is not the proportional share of responsibility the federal agency 
bears for the decline in the species, but what jeopardy might result from the agency’s  
proposed actions in the present and future human and natural contexts.” See id. at 1093. 
 154. See id. at 1089–90. 
 155. Id. at 1094. “The agency essentially asks that we take its word that the species will 
be protected if its plans are followed. If this were sufficient, the NMFS could simply assert 
that its decisions were protective and so withstand all scrutiny.” Id. at 1092. 
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jeopardized by eight years of much lower flows.156 Noting that five genera-
tions of coho in the Klamath River would be affected by these low flows, 
the court faulted the BO’s failure to explain how the RPA nonetheless 
avoided jeopardy, declaring that an agency may not “provide only partial 
protection for a species for several generations without any analysis of how 
doing so will affect the species.”157 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to 
the district court for “appropriate injunctive relief,” stressing that “[i]t is not 
enough to provide water for the coho to survive in five years, if in the 
meantime, the population has been weakened or destroyed by inadequate 
water flows.”158 The litigation over the 2002 Klamath Project BO illustrates 
that an RPA may be vulnerable to challenge, despite the Service’s expertise, 
if the “no jeopardy” conclusion relies on a faulty view of the law or a weak 
explanation of effects on the species. 
3. Middle Rio Grande 
The “Middle” Rio Grande is a 170-mile stretch of river in New Mexico 
between Cochiti Dam and the headwaters of Elephant Butte Reservoir.159 
Flows in this reach are heavily influenced by the Middle Rio Grande  
Conservancy District (MRGCD), which diverts water for irrigation of 
more than 60,000 acres of the Rio Grande Valley.160 The MRGCD has 
contracts to receive water from two USBR projects, the Middle Rio Grande 
Project and the San Juan–Chama Project; several other New Mexico water 
users, notably the City of Albuquerque, also have San Juan–Chama  
contracts.161 Operation of these projects became subject to the ESA when 
the Rio Grande silvery minnow was listed as an endangered species in 
1994.162 Once abundant throughout much of the Rio Grande watershed, the 
                                                                                                                      
 156. Id. at 1093–94. The court noted, for example, that the RPA set long-term July 
flows at 1,000 cfs, but the RPA would allow flows as low as 570 cfs from 2006–2010. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1095. 
 159. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973, 978–79 (D.N.M. 
2002) (describing the various reaches of the 170-mile Middle Rio Grande, which is segmented 
by several major diversion dams). 
 160. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1134 (10th Cir. 2003), 
vacated as moot, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 161. See 333 F.3d at 1122–27 (discussing these two projects and their associated  
contracts). 
 162. See, e.g., Sean O’Connor, The Rio Grande Silvery Minnow and the Endangered 
Species Act, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 673 (2002); Beth Richards, The Pump Don’t Work Because the 
Bureau Took the Handle: The United States Bureau of Reclamation’s Discretion to Reduce Water 
Deliveries to Comply with the Endangered Species Act, 4 WYO. L. REV. 113 (2004); Ethan R. 
Hasenstein, Frankenstein and Pitbull? Transmogrifying the Endangered Species Act and “Fixing” 
the San Juan–Chama Project after Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 34 ENVTL. L. 1247 
(2004). 
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minnow had been extirpated from all but the “middle” reach and faced 
extinction because its river habitat had been dramatically altered by dams, 
diversion structures, and low flows.163 
In the late 1990s, with the silvery minnow populations continuing to 
decline despite the ESA listing,164 the USBR initiated section 7 consultation 
on its project operations.165 In its 1999 biological assessment, however, the 
USBR argued that its operating discretion was limited by its water delivery 
obligations. The USBR contended, and the FWS agreed,166 that the USBR 
could not reduce deliveries to users holding contracts for San Juan–Chama 
Project or Middle Rio Grande Project water, regardless of the ESA.  
Environmental groups challenged the resulting BO on operation of these 
projects, and although the district court found that the government did 
indeed have discretion to reduce water deliveries for the minnow’s  
benefit,167 Federal District Judge James A. Parker nonetheless upheld the 
BO because the FWS had “come up with an interim solution to avoid  
jeopardy” that “may be workable.”168 
In September 2002, however, the FWS—in the midst of extreme 
drought conditions169—issued a new BO that allowed the key reach of the 
Rio Grande to go dry, potentially wiping out the last wild population of 
silvery minnows.170 Judge Parker refused to approve the new BO, which 
found the minnow would be jeopardized by the USBR’s operations but 
contained no RPA.171 His opinion pointedly criticized the USBR for allow-
                                                                                                                      
 163. Final Rule to List the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow As an Endangered Species, 59 
Fed. Reg. 36988 (July 20, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). In listing the species as 
endangered, FWS also identified other factors for the silvery minnow’s decline, including 
competition from non-native species. Id. at 36989. 
 164. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1229 (D.N.M. 
2002) (noting evidence of decline of silvery minnow populations since 1994). 
 165. Joan E. Drake, Contractual Discretion and the Endangered Species Act: Can the Bureau 
of Reclamation Reallocate Federal Project Water for Endangered Species in the Middle Rio Grande?, 
41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 487, 496–97 (2001). 
 166. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973, 998–99 (D.N.M. 2002) 
(noting that FWS adopted the USBR’s legal position regarding the USBR’s limited discre-
tion in operating the projects). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 999–1000. The court noted that FWS had reached this solution “in coordi-
nation with all the major players in the middle Rio Grande basin.” Id. at 999. 
 169. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1225–28. 
 170. Id. at 1231–32 (noting that the USBR had proposed to allow the “all-important” 
San Acacia reach—home to nearly all of the remaining wild minnows—to dry up, and that 
“extensive river drying in the San Acacia Reach could result in the extinction of the silvery 
minnow in the wild”). 
 171. “There appears to be no precedent, and the parties have presented none, for a 
Court to affirm a BO that has a finding of jeopardy with no RPA . . . .” Id. at 1226. The 
court stressed that only the Endangered Species Committee, often called the “God Squad,” 
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ing a crisis to develop by delivering full water supplies in 2002 despite the 
obvious drought conditions, by waiting to reinitiate consultation until nearly 
all the available water was gone,172 and finally by refusing to release stored 
water for minnow survival in order to protect water users from future 
shortages.173 Although the ESA allows agencies “to consider the interests of 
others besides an endangered species if they can at the same time avoid 
jeopardy to the endangered species, it is not allowable for agencies to give 
paramount weight to the interests of others when by doing so they have no 
proposal to avoid jeopardy.”174 The court ordered the USBR to provide 
certain minimum flows through 2003.175  
A divided Tenth Circuit panel affirmed Judge Parker’s decision on the 
scope of the USBR’s discretion regarding project operations.176 Within 
months, the panel’s decision was vacated as moot,177 but by then the FWS 
had already issued a new BO for project operations.178 In addition,  
Congress partially undid the Court of Appeals decision through an appro-
priations rider prohibiting use of water from the San Juan–Chama Project 
(except for water leased or purchased from willing sellers) to meet the 
requirements of the ESA, and declaring that compliance with restrictions in 
a March 2003 BO would fully satisfy ESA section 7.179 The original “minnow 
                                                                                                                      
had the power to allow a federal agency action that would jeopardize a listed species. Id. at 
1224–25. 
 172. Id. at 1225–26. 
 173. Id. at 1233–34. 
 174. Id. at 1227. 
 175. The court allowed lower flows for the remainder of 2002 than would have been 
allowed under the 2001 BO. For 2003, the court required the USBR to maintain the flows 
provided in 2001 BO unless and until a new one was issued. Id. at 1237–38. 
 176. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated as 
moot, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).  
 177. Id. at 1222. The court found the appeal moot for various reasons, including a 
subsequent Congressional enactment relating to the San Juan–Chama Project, the effective 
expiration of Judge Parker’s injunction, and favorable climatic conditions that had resulted in 
better habitat for the minnow. Id. at 1219–21.  
 178. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (D.N.M. 
2005) (new BO issued in March 2003). 
 179. The statute stated in part: 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior,  
acting through the Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation . . . may not use 
discretion, if any, to restrict, reduce or reallocate any water stored in Heron  
Reservoir or delivered pursuant to San Juan-Chama Project contracts, including 
execution of said contracts facilitated by the Middle Rio Grande Project, to meet 
the requirements of the Endangered Species Act, unless such water is acquired or 
otherwise made available from a willing seller or lessor and the use is in compliance 
with the laws of the State of New Mexico, including but not limited to, permitting 
requirements. 
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rider” locked in the 2003 BO for two years,180 but Congress soon extended 
that period to ten years.181 Responding to the outcry in New Mexico against 
the Tenth Circuit decision,182 Congress sought to give a measure of certainty 
to the City of Albuquerque and other water users on the Middle Rio 
Grande.183 The silvery minnow story demonstrates that ESA restrictions on 
traditional water deliveries can provoke a strong political backlash, and 
Congress always has the last word in deciding whether species will be  
protected.184 
While the Lower Colorado, Klamath, and Middle Rio Grande consulta-
tion stories produced three different morals, they also have some notable 
similarities. Each consultation resulted in a BO that found jeopardy to a 
listed species based on the USBR’s project operations. Each BO was  
challenged in federal court and litigated up through a court of appeals. And 
as explained in the next Part, each of these disputes—perhaps surprisingly—
was followed by some type of negotiation or collaborative process focused 
on the needs of the listed species. 
                                                                                                                      
(b) Complying with the reasonable and prudent alternatives and the incidental 
take limits defined in the Biological Opinion released by the United States Fish 
and Wildlife Service dated March 17, 2003 combined with efforts carried out  
pursuant to Public Law 106-377, Public Law 107-66, and Public Law 108-7 fully 
meet all requirements of the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.) for 
the conservation of the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (Hybognathus amarus) and 
the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher (Empidonax trailii extimus) on the Middle 
Rio Grande in New Mexico. 
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108–137, § 208, 117 Stat. 
1827, 1849–50 (2003). 
 180. Id. § 208(d), 117 Stat. 1850. 
 181. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 205(d), 118 Stat. 2935, 
2949 (2004). 
 182. See Lara Katz, History of the Minnow Litigation and its Implications for the Future of 
Reservoir Operations on the Rio Grande, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 675, 683–85 (2007) (describing 
a Congressional field hearing in Belen, New Mexico, where the 10th Circuit decision was 
criticized by all witnesses except a representative of the environmental plaintiffs). 
 183. Id. at 685–87 (quoting New Mexico Senator Jeff Bingaman as saying, among other 
things, that the rider was needed to provide “some level of certainty for water users”); 
Michael Connor, Commentary on “History of the Minnow Litigation and Its Implications for the 
Future of the Reservoir Operations on the Rio Grande,” 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 693, 694 (2007) 
(describing the rider as “providing some level of certainty for water users but still necessitating 
changes in the way water is used in the Middle Rio Grande”). Connor, now Commissioner 
of the USBR, was Senator Bingaman’s primary water staff person at the time of the rider. Id. 
at 693. 
 184. Congress has acted to override the ESA before. One of the earliest major ESA 
controversies involved the endangered snail darter and the nearly completed Tellico Dam. 
After the U.S. Supreme Court famously held in T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), that 
finishing the dam would jeopardize the species in violation of the ESA, Congress ordered 
the dam completed nonetheless. 125 CONG. REC. S23,872 (Sept. 10, 1979). 
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4. Further Developments: Negotiation Follows  
Consultation and Litigation 
On the Middle Rio Grande, the “minnow rider”—while protecting  
water users and preventing legal challenges to the 2003 BO—also provided 
for an Endangered Species Collaborative Program.185 Specifically, Congress 
directed the Interior to establish an executive committee “for purposes of 
improving the efficiency and expediting the efforts of the Endangered 
Species Collaborative Program Workgroup,” with members from the 
USBR, the FWS, a New Mexico state agency, MRGCD, and other  
identified stakeholders.186 The Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species 
Collaborative Program continues to this day; its home page describes it as 
“a partnership involving 16 current signatories organized to protect and 
improve the status of endangered species along the Middle Rio Grande 
(MRG) of New Mexico, while simultaneously protecting existing and  
future regional water uses . . . . Program activities include water acquisition 
and management, habitat restoration, endangered species monitoring, and 
silvery minnow propagation.”187  
In the Klamath Basin, continuing declines in salmon and other  
fisheries—and related conflicts over water management and other issues—
led to major negotiated agreements188 in the latter half of the last decade.189 
The Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA) was the product of 
                                                                                                                      
 185. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-137, § 209, 
117 Stat. 1827, 1850 (2003). 
 186. The other designated seats on the executive committee are assigned to “other 
federal agencies” (besides the USBR and the FWS), municipalities, agricultural communities, 
and Middle Rio Grande Pueblos (six Indian communities located along this reach of the 
river); one seat was also reserved for “universities and environmental groups.” Id. 
 187. MIDDLE RIO GRANDE ENDANGERED SPECIES COLLABORATIVE PROGRAM, 
http://www.mrgesa.com (last visited July 12, 2012). The USBR is the lead agency for the 
Collaborative Program. Id. Current signatories include the USBR, the FWS, the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, and the Army Corps of Engineers; the City of Albuquerque and its water 
utility; MRGCD and an association of its patrons; four New Mexico state agencies; four 
Indian Pueblos; and the University of New Mexico. History, MIDDLE RIO GRANDE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES COLLABORATIVE PROGRAM, http://www.mrgesa.com/Default.aspx? 
tabid=175 (last visited July 12, 2012). Environmental groups, however, are conspicuously 
absent. The website also explains how the program was prompted by efforts to resolve the 
silvery minnow litigation, and grew out of an ESA Workgroup organized by the USBR and 
the New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission. Id. 
 188. This article focuses on the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement, but there is also 
a related Klamath Hydropower Settlement Agreement. See Klamath Restoration: Background, 
KLAMATHRESTORATION.GOV, http://www.klamathrestoration.gov/about-us/background (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2012). 
 189. For an excellent summary of the factors contributing to the formation of these 
agreements, see Hannah Gosnell & Erin Clover Kelly, Peace on the River? Social-Ecological 
Restoration and Large Dam Removal in the Klamath Basin, USA, 3 WATER ALTERNATIVES, no. 
2, 2010 at 361. 
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three years of negotiations involving federal and state agencies (both Oregon 
and California), tribes, local governments, water users, and conservation 
groups.190 The KBRA was designed to produce “effective and durable  
solutions” to restore and sustain natural fish populations throughout the 
basin and ensure reliable water and power supplies for agriculture and other 
uses.191 Existing irrigation was not fully protected, however, as the KBRA 
set limits on water diversions for the USBR’s Klamath Project that would 
result in deliveries of about 100,000 acre-feet less than demand in very dry 
years.192 This wide-ranging and detailed agreement193 also addresses  
“regulatory assurances,” including ESA compliance,194 and suggests that the 
Services should avoid further restrictions on irrigation deliveries in any 
future consultation on Klamath Project operations.195 The KBRA requires 
congressional approval, however, and is currently stalled due to Tea Party 
opposition.196 
For purposes of this article, however, the Lower Colorado River Multi-
Species Conservation Program (MSCP) is most significant because it figures 
prominently in section 7 compliance for the USBR’s Lower Colorado River 
operations. The MSCP has been described as “a cooperative effort between 
Federal and non-federal entities” that serves three purposes: “conserving 
habitat and working toward the recovery of threatened and endangered 
species, as well as reducing the likelihood of additional species being listed; 
accommodating present water diversions and power production and opti-
mizing opportunities for future water and power development . . . and 
                                                                                                                      
 190. SUMMARY: KLAMATH BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT 1, 10-11 (2010), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/kbra/docs/Web%20KBRA%20updates/Summary_of_Klamath_ 
Basin_Restoration_Agreement.pdf (this summary gives no indication of who wrote it, but it 
can be found on the website for the USBR’s Klamath Basin Area Office). 
 191. Id. at 1. 
 192. Id. at 4. 
 193. The KBRA has nearly 40 sections covering over 170 pages, plus nearly 200 pages 
of appendices. KLAMATH BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY OF 
PUBLIC AND TRUST RESOURCES AND AFFECTED COMMUNITIES (2010), available at 
http://www.klamathrestoration.gov/sites/klamathrestoration.gov/files/Klamath-Agreements/ 
Klamath-Basin-Restoration-Agreement-2-18-10signed.pdf. 
 194. Id. at 143–62. The ESA material, id. at 153–59, addresses both section 7 and 
section 10 compliance. 
 195. Id. at 158–59 (stating that if Services find jeopardy in a future BO on Klamath 
Project operations, “before seeking any further limitations on diversion, use, and reuse of 
water related to the Klamath Reclamation Project beyond the limitations provided in . . . 
this Agreement, NMFS and FWS will consider, to the maximum extent consistent with the 
ESA,” certain specified alternative approaches). 
 196. William Yardley, Tea Party Blocks Pact to Restore a West Coast River, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 18, 2012, at A16. The deal’s opponents see the federal government as being more  
concerned with fish than farmers, and suggest that the KBRA is related to an environmentalist 
campaign to remove larger dams in the Columbia River system. Id. 
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providing the basis for incidental take authorizations.”197 Thus, the MSCP 
is designed not only to benefit species and their habitat while allowing for 
ongoing and future water uses, but also to provide coverage against  
potential “take” liability for both federal and non-federal actors. 
Efforts to launch the MSCP date to 1995, when Interior and state 
agency representatives from Arizona, California, and Nevada signed an 
initial agreement to develop the program.198 Although still far from  
complete, the MSCP appeared in the 1997 BO for USBR operations on the 
Lower Colorado, as continued development of the MSCP was a long-term 
element of the RPA.199 By 2005, the process produced a conservation plan 
with several types of elements, including maintaining and creating habitat 
for covered species, avoiding and minimizing impacts from water use and 
development activities, implementing “population enhancement measures” 
for covered species, and conducting monitoring and research activities.200 
Along with federal and state agencies, the MSCP also covers dozens of 
water and power providers (primarily cities and special districts) in the 
three Lower Basin states.201 In order to provide a basis for take coverage for 
state and local entities, the conservation plan developed through the MSCP 
serves as a habitat conservation plan under ESA section 10.202 In 2005, the 
Interior Secretary determined that the plan was legally sufficient to serve as 
the basis for an Incidental Take Permit for the non-federal participants.203 
The MSCP also covers a range of federal agency actions, including the 
USBR’s Lower Colorado River operations relating to water management, 
flood control, and hydropower production.204 For these federal activities, 
the MSCP’s conservation plan is geared toward avoiding jeopardy to listed 
species or adverse modification of their critical habitat, as required by  
section 7. In 2005, the FWS issued a BO for the federal actions addressed in 
                                                                                                                      
 197. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, LOWER COLORADO 
MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PLAN 2 (2005), available at www.lcrmscp.gov/publications/ 
rec_of_dec_apr05.pdf. 
 198. Id. at 8. 
 199. Id. at 5–6; see supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text. 
 200. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, LOWER COLORADO 
MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PLAN, supra note 197, at 10–11. “Covered species,” only 
some of which are listed under the ESA, are identified on pages 17–18, and conservation 
measures for these species are more specifically described on pages 18–20. 
 201. Id. at 16 (listing participating entities from each of the three states). 
 202. Id. at 8–9 (explaining that MSCP participants requested that the plan provide 
coverage under both section 7 and section 10 of the ESA because of some uncertainty  
regarding which section might be relevant for particular entities). 
 203. Id. at 12–15 (summarizing section 10 criteria and explaining how the plan met 
them). 
 204. Id. at 16–17 (also explaining covered activities of the FWS, the National Park 
Service, the Western Area Power Administration, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the 
Bureau of Land Management). 
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the MSCP, including the USBR’s non-discretionary operations on the 
Lower Colorado.205 This BO reached a “no jeopardy” conclusion,206 and 
provided an incidental take statement that incorporated the conservation 
measures from the MSCP, requiring the USBR and other federal agencies 
to undertake these measures in order to gain take coverage under section 7.207 
Thus, on the Lower Colorado, Klamath, and Middle Rio Grande,  
consultation produced litigation, which was followed by negotiations on 
addressing the needs of water users and listed species. Conflicts over the 
application of the ESA to water management and use have also given rise to 
several established collaborative efforts, including the Edwards Aquifer 
RIP208 and the Missouri River Recovery Implementation Committee209 as 
well as the four RIPs discussed below. The next Section examines these 
four programs, with a particular emphasis on their relationship to section 7 
compliance. 
                                                                                                                      
 205. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., BIOLOGICAL AND 
CONFERENCE OPINION ON THE LOWER COLORADO RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION 
PROGRAM 18–22 (2005) (listing USBR activities on the Lower Colorado, but stating that 
some activities are non-discretionary and therefore not subject to consultation requirements). 
 206. Id. at 130. 
 207. Id. at 135–38. 
 208. For an excellent review of the early years of the Edwards Aquifer ESA controversy, 
see Todd Votteler, The Little Fish that Roared: The Endangered Species Act, State Groundwater 
Law, and Private Property Rights Collide over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 ENVTL. L. 845 
(1998). ESA litigation in the 1990s initially drove the need to protect the habitat of several 
listed species that depend on spring flows fed by the aquifer. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lujan, 
1993 WL 151353 (W.D. Tex. 1993). After years of local and state-level efforts to control 
groundwater use for the protection of endangered species, the FWS initiated development 
of a RIP for the Edwards Aquifer in 2006. ROBERT GULLEY, EDWARDS AQUIFER 
RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM (EARIP) SUMMARY 2 (Mar. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.edwardsrip.org/pdfs/eariphistoryMarch2010.pdf. 
 209. The Corps of Engineers’ operation of Missouri River reservoirs generated a flurry 
of litigation in the dry years of the early 2000s, including separate cases brought by several 
states. See South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2003). Environmental 
groups also challenged the Corps’ ESA compliance. Am. Rivers v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
271 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D.D.C. 2003). All of this litigation prompted new Missouri River 
biological opinions and operating plans, which were eventually upheld by the courts. In re 
Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005). The Missouri River 
Recovery Implementation Committee (MRRIC) initially grew out of a 2003 consultation on 
the Corps’ Missouri River operations; the Corps agreed to “form an advisory group . . . 
made up of a broad group of stakeholders from all states along the River, [to] make recom-
mendations on potential actions that could be undertaken to improve the functioning of the 
River while minimizing impacts to human uses.” U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 2003 
AMENDMENT TO THE 2000 BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE OPERATION OF THE MISSOURI 
RIVER MAINSTEM RESERVOIR SYSTEM 25, 259 (Dec. 16, 2003) (on file with author). Later, 
Congress authorized the Secretary of the Army to establish the MRRIC in section 5018 of 
the 2007 Water Resources Development Act. Pub. L. 110-114, § 5018, 121 Stat. 1041, 1199 
(2007). 
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III. RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PLANS FOR  
RIVER-DEPENDENT SPECIES 
Beginning with the pioneering Upper Colorado program in the 1980s, 
the RIP has increasingly become the preferred means of ESA compliance in 
the context of western water management and use. These programs have 
spread to the San Juan210 and Platte Rivers,211 and a new RIP was recently 
approved for the Middle Rio Grande in New Mexico.212 No two programs 
are alike, both due to the unique characteristics of each river system and the 
lack of statute or rule language specific to RIPs;213 thus, there is no defined 
or standard RIP approach to ESA implementation, only a set of programs 
with some similar elements. 
This Section briefly describes the origins and purposes of the Upper 
Colorado, San Juan, Platte, and Middle Rio Grande RIPs, the roles that 
states and stakeholders play in them, and the ways that they relate to ESA 
section 7 compliance. It concludes by summarizing the legal success and 
political support these programs have attained. 
A. A Big-Picture Look at RIPs 
1. Origins 
The earliest RIP dates to 1987, when the Recovery Implementation 
Program for Endangered Fish Species in the Upper Colorado River Basin 
was finalized.214 Many entities played a key role in developing the Upper 
Colorado RIP, including the USBR and the FWS, the States of Colorado, 
Utah, and Wyoming, and representatives of water users and environmental 
groups.215 Following the completion of the RIP Program Document, the 
Interior Secretary and the governors of the three states signed a Cooperative 
Agreement216 in which all the parties agreed to participate in and implement 
the recovery program set forth in that document.217 
This original RIP arose out of controversy regarding the application of 
ESA section 7 to water use and development activities in the Upper  
                                                                                                                      
 210. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13. 
 211. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY 
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM (2006) [hereinafter Platte River RIP ROD]. 
 212. Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16. 
 213. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 214. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12. 
 215. Id. at 1-1. The acknowledgment page of the Upper Colorado RIP Program Docu-
ment credits a “task group” of eleven people, each representing a specific interest. Id. at i. 
 216. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT FOR RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR 
ENDANGERED SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN (1988). The Administrator 
of the federal Western Area Power Administration also signed the document. Id. 
 217. Id. 
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Colorado River Basin. Three fish species in the basin had been listed under 
the ESA, and a fourth was a candidate for listing due to habitat loss and 
various other factors.218 By the mid-1980s FWS had issued numerous  
jeopardy opinions regarding the operations of both existing and proposed 
water projects, putting new water development in serious doubt.219 After 
trying and failing to obtain ESA relief in Congress and the courts,220 water 
users began seeking an administrative solution that would comply with 
existing law while also allowing continued water use and development in 
the basin.221 In 1984, an Upper Colorado River Coordinating Committee 
was formed under a Memorandum of Understanding among the FWS, the 
USBR, and the three states, and this committee provided the forum for the 
years of negotiations that would eventually produce the Upper Colorado 
RIP.222  
As the oldest RIP, the Upper Colorado program provided a sort of 
template for those that followed in the San Juan, Platte, and Middle Rio 
Grande. Moreover, the later RIPs would originate much like the first one 
did. Although the details obviously vary, there are two major common 
elements to all the RIP’s creation stories. 
Initially, each RIP grew out of a contentious (or potentially contentious) 
section 7 consultation on one or more water projects in a particular river 
basin. The San Juan River Basin RIP, established in the early 1990s, was 
prompted by jeopardy opinions on the USBR’s soon-to-be-built Animas–La 
Plata Project in southwestern Colorado, and on completion of the partially 
built Navajo Indian Irrigation Project.223 The San Juan Basin, which was 
                                                                                                                      
 218. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 1-3 (identifying 
species and causes for their decline). 
 219. See Hannah Gosnell, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act and the Art of Compro-
mise: The Evolution of a Reasonable and Prudent Alternative for the Animas-La Plata Project, 41 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 561, 571–72 (2001); Tom Pitts, The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish 
Recovery Program: A Success Story, IRRIGATION LEADER, Oct. 2010, at 24. 
 220. See Gosnell, supra note 219, at 571. 
 221. Id. at 572; Pitts, supra note 219, at 24 (describing Colorado Water Congress  
endangered species initiative). 
 222. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 1-6. One of the key 
players in developing the RIP was Tom Pitts, representing the Colorado Water Congress. Id. 
at i. According to Pitts, it was the Colorado Water Congress that proposed a focus on recovery 
and delisting of the fish species (rather than simply avoidance of jeopardy), because recovery 
would best fulfill the ESA’s goals while providing maximum regulatory certainty for water 
use and development. Pitts, supra note 219, at 24; Telephone Interview with Tom Pitts, 
Water Consult, Co-founder, in Loveland, Colo. (June 20, 2012). 
 223. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 10–11. For a detailed and 
fascinating account of the events leading up to the formation of the San Juan RIP, see 
Gosnell, supra note 219, at 578–609. Gosnell’s article focuses chiefly on the Animas–La Plata 
Project, but discusses the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project consultation at 602–06. 
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carved out in the early stages of negotiating the Upper Colorado RIP,224 
developed its own fish recovery program as part of the RPA that allowed 
Animas–La Plata to be constructed.225 The Platte River RIP arose out of 
consultations regarding existing water projects in both Colorado and  
Nebraska,226 with jeopardy opinions issued in 1994 and 1997, respectively.227 
Consultation on operation of the USBR’s water projects on the North 
Platte was essentially put off pending development of the RIP in the 1990s 
and 2000s.228 The latest RIP is being launched in the midst of a new  
consultation on federal water project operations in the Middle Rio Grande 
of New Mexico.229 As noted above, earlier consultations in this basin  
produced years of litigation and a congressional rider that effectively 
blocked litigation over the existing BO, which expires in 2013.230 
In addition, every RIP was preceded by years of negotiations involving 
representatives of the FWS, the USBR, state officials, and others. As noted 
above, the Upper Colorado RIP took over three years to negotiate once the 
Upper Colorado River Coordinating Committee was formed in 1984.231 The 
San Juan RIP was developed relatively quickly, although it still took two-
plus years from the beginning of discussions on an Animas–La Plata Project 
RPA in the summer of 1990,232 to the signing of the Cooperative  
Agreement establishing the RIP in October 1992.233 By contrast, the Platte 
RIP took more than a decade following the initial, 1994 federal–state  
Memorandum of Understanding that launched the process toward an ESA 
                                                                                                                      
 224. See Gosnell, supra note 219, at 572–73 (noting the absence of any jeopardy  
opinions in the San Juan Basin in the mid-1980s, and the expected difficulty of working with 
New Mexico state water officials). 
 225. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 19–21; Tom Pitts, The San 
Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program: An Ongoing Success Story, IRRIGATION 
LEADER, June 2011, at 8–9. 
 226. See John Echeverria, No Success Like Failure: The Platte River Collaborative  
Watershed Planning Process, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 559, 565–70 (describing 
how consultations in Colorado and Nebraska, along with political factors, led to an initial 
Platte River agreement in 1994 and a later one in 1997). 
 227. Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 25–26. Remarkably, the RPAs for these 
opinions relied on the work-in-progress RIP—which would not be finalized until 2006—to 
provide the long-term measures needed to avoid jeopardy. Id.  
 228. See id. at 26–27. 
 229. Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 6 (noting 
that FWS issued a ten-year BO for the Middle Rio Grande in March 2003), 19 (noting 
connection between the RIP and “the [contemplated] 2013 programmatic BO(s)”). 
 230. See supra notes 164–184 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 214–222 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Gosnell, supra note 219 at 590. Another source indicates that such discussions 
began in 1989. Pitts, supra note 225, at 8. 
 233. Pitts, supra note 225, at 9. 
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program for the basin;234 a later agreement set up a Governance Committee 
of state, federal, and stakeholder representatives to negotiate the program.235 
The new Middle Rio Grande RIP is a product of the Middle Rio Grande 
Endangered Species Collaborative Program,236 which began working to 
address ESA issues in the basin even before a 2002 agreement that formalized 
the program’s governance.237 The Executive Committee for the Collaborative 
Program first decided in August 2009 to turn the Middle Rio Grande  
program into a RIP,238 although the draft program document would take 
another three years to complete.239 
2. Purposes 
Every RIP has seemingly coequal goals: benefiting certain listed  
species with an eye toward recovery, and providing ESA compliance for 
existing uses and future development of water resources. Some of the RIP 
documents are quite specific about these twin goals, others less so, and the 
wording varies from one program to another. Despite these differences, 
however, all the RIPs seek to achieve these two primary ends. 
Program documents for the San Juan and Middle Rio Grande RIPs 
make this point very clearly at the outset. The latter document states the 
RIP’s general purpose as: 
To protect and improve the status of species listed pursuant to the 
ESA within the Middle Rio Grande (MRG) by implementing cer-
tain recovery activities to benefit those species and their associated 
habitats . . .  
and, simultaneously, 
                                                                                                                      
 234. Echeverria, supra note 226, at 567. In fact, efforts to develop a Platte River  
program date to 1985, when a committee was formed to conduct a “Platte River Management 
Joint Study,” which proceeded for roughly a decade but was ultimately rejected by the State 
of Wyoming. E-mail from Tom Pitts, Water Consult, to Reed D. Benson, Professor of Law, 
University of New Mexico School of Law (Oct. 10, 2012, 11:38 MDT) (on file with author). 
The Platte River RIP was finalized in 2006. Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211. 
 235. Echeverria, supra note 234, at 570–73. 
 236. See supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text. 
 237. Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 5 (noting 
that Congress first appropriated funds for Collaborative Program activities in 2001, and the 
MOU regarding program governance was signed in Apr. 2002). 
 238. MIDDLE RIO GRANDE ENDANGERED SPECIES COLLABORATIVE PROGRAM, 
QUARTERLY PROGRAM UPDATE, JULY–SEPTEMBER 2009 at 2 (2009). 
 239. Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16 (dated July 12, 
2012). This document remains incomplete, however, both in the main text (see pp. 15, 18, 
and 21) and especially the appendices (see p. 26). 
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To protect existing and future water uses while complying with  
applicable state and federal laws, rules and regulations, and to serve 
as the ESA coverage vehicle for water uses and management in the 
MRG Program area.240 
The San Juan RIP makes a similar statement on page one, stating as dual 
goals “to conserve populations” of listed fish species in the basin consistent 
with ESA recovery goals, and “to proceed with water development” in the 
basin consistent with federal and state law.241  
The Platte RIP documents are somewhat less straightforward on this 
point, but they too reflect the need to provide for water use and development 
while conserving listed species and their habitat. The agreement establishing 
the Governance Committee stated these as the first two aims of the  
program.242 The Secretary’s decision to implement the RIP states, “The 
Program will assist in the conservation and recovery of the target species in 
the Basin and implement relevant parts of the recovery plans thereby 
providing ESA regulatory compliance for effects to the target species’ river 
habitats from existing and new water-related activities in the Basin . . . .”243 
The Governance Committee alternative was selected because it “best meets 
the obligations of Interior to conserve and protect threatened and endangered 
species while continuing to provide water supplies for Reclamation projects 
and [FWS] activities.”244 
The Upper Colorado RIP program document, perhaps surprisingly, 
seems to state a single “ultimate goal”: to recover the target species to the 
                                                                                                                      
 240. Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 3. 
 241. This statement reflects the water development interests of Indian tribes in the 
San Juan Basin, referring “federal trust responsibilities to the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 
Ute Mountain Indian Tribe, Jicarilla Apache Nation, and the Navajo Nation.” San Juan RIP 
Program Document, supra note 13, at 1.  
 242. The 1997 Cooperative Agreement among Interior and the three states stated that 
the intent of the program was to: 
(1) secure defined benefits for the target species and their associated habitats to 
assist in their conservation and recovery through a basin-wide cooperative  
approach that can be agreed to by the three states and the Department of the  
Interior (DOI); (2) serve as the reasonable and prudent alternative to offset the 
effects of existing and new water related activities in the Platte River Basin that, 
in the absence of such a Program, would be found by FWS to be likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of the target species or adversely modify designated  
critical habitat; 
as well as to avoid further species listings and to mitigate the impacts of new water-related 
activities. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT FOR PLATTE RIVER RESEARCH AND OTHER 
EFFORTS RELATING TO ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITATS ALONG THE CENTRAL PLATTE 
RIVER, NEBRASKA, 2–3 (1997). 
 243. Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 4. 
 244. Id. at 3. 
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point where it would not require ESA protection.245 But it also summarizes 
the interests of each of the participants in developing the program, including 
the interests of the states in water development, the USBR in reservoir 
operations, and water users in protecting existing legal regimes for  
allocation.246 It then declares that each of the participants “is committed to 
the successful implementation of a recovery program that will provide for 
recovery of the endangered fish species, consistent with Federal law and all 
applicable State laws and systems for water resource development and 
use.”247 And it makes no bones about why the RIP came about: “The primary 
impetus for developing this recovery program was to provide a mechanism 
to resolve the Section 7 conflict in the upper basin.”248  
3. State and Stakeholder Roles 
Another standard feature of RIPs is the importance of state officials 
and stakeholder representatives in both the development and implementation 
of the programs. As noted above, every RIP was preceded by years of  
discussions on water and ESA issues,249 and with the possible exception  
of the San Juan program,250 the majority of key players were representatives 
of state governments or stakeholder groups. The “task group” that produced 
the Upper Colorado RIP program document had four state officials, four 
stakeholder representatives, and three federal officials.251 The Governance 
Committee for development of the Platte RIP had three representatives of 
the basin states, five stakeholder representatives, and two Interior officials.252 
                                                                                                                      
 245. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 1-1. 
 246. Other identified participants include the FWS, with its ESA responsibilities, and 
conservation groups, with their interests preserving the species and their habitat. Id. at 1-1, 
1-3. 
 247. Id. at 1-3. 
 248. Id. at 1-9. 
 249. See supra notes 231–239 and accompanying text. 
 250. The San Juan RIP was not preceded by an agreement that defined the participation 
and ground rules of the formative negotiations, so unlike the other RIPs, there was no 
official team that developed the program. One source states that “in 1989, water users, tribes, 
federal agencies, and the states of Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah began discussing ESA 
compliance for water projects in the San Juan Basin, initially focusing on the Animas–La 
Plata Project.” Pitts, supra note 225, at 8. Gosnell’s account of the search for an Animas–La 
Plata RPA focuses on the roles of the USBR and the FWS, but also indicates that water 
users were actively involved while environmentalists chose to sit out the process. Gosnell, 
supra note 219, at 590–96. 
 251. Two of the state officials were from Wyoming, while Colorado and Utah had one 
each. The stakeholder representatives included two from water user organizations and two 
from conservation groups. Two of the three federal officials were from the USBR, the other 
from the FWS. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at i. 
 252. Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming each had one representative. The five stakeholder 
representatives included three from water user organizations and two from conservation 
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The Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program  
Executive Committee, which began moving toward a RIP in 2009,253  
currently has seats for three federal agencies, three state agencies, four 
Indian pueblos, and five stakeholder groups.254 
In addition, each of the RIPs was finalized through the signing of a  
cooperative agreement by the Interior Secretary, governors of the partici-
pating states, and sometimes others. Federal officials and three governors 
signed the Upper Colorado agreement in 1988.255 Four years later, the San 
Juan RIP agreement was signed not only by the Interior Secretary and the 
governors of Colorado and New Mexico, but also by leaders of three Indian 
tribes in the Four Corners area;256 the State of Utah and the Navajo Nation 
chose not to sign, although the Navajos eventually did in 1996.257 The  
Interior Secretary and the governors of Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming 
signed the Platte RIP agreement in 2006,258 following the Secretary’s  
decision to choose the plan negotiated by the Governance Committee.259 As 
of this writing, a cooperative agreement is still being developed for the new 
Middle Rio Grande RIP,260 but it is clear that parties will need to sign onto 
that cooperative agreement in order to participate.261 
                                                                                                                      
groups. The USBR and the FWS each had one seat. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT FOR 
PLATTE RIVER RESEARCH AND OTHER EFFORTS RELATING TO ENDANGERED SPECIES 
HABITATS ALONG THE CENTRAL PLATTE RIVER, NEBRASKA 9–10 (1997). 
 253. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 254. Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program, Bylaws 5–6, 8 
(Sept. 2009), available at http://www.mrgesa.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ObkRkJtOTM 
M%3D&tabid=222&mid=580. The bylaws state that the Executive Committee is composed 
of certain entities that have signed a MOA, id. at 8; the bylaws also list fifteen entities that 
have been “invited to sign the MOA,” including the FWS, the USBR, and the Corps of 
Engineers on the federal side; three state agencies; four pueblos; the City of Albuquerque; 
the water utility authority serving Albuquerque and Bernalillo County; the Middle Rio 
Grande Conservancy District, which primarily supplies irrigation water; and one seat each 
for agricultural and conservation groups, neither of which is specified. Id. at 5–6.  
 255. See supra notes 216–217 and accompanying text. 
 256. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 50–55 (signature pages of the 
1992 Cooperative Agreement). The Jicarilla Apache, Southern Ute, and Ute Mountain Ute 
tribes signed the agreement in 1992. 
 257. Id. at 11. The State of Utah, however, has never come aboard. Id. at 29. Gosnell, 
supra note 219 at 602–06, explains the Navajo Nation’s concerns and objections at the time 
the original Cooperative Agreement was signed. 
 258. PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM COOPERATIVE 
AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at 4 (2006). 
 259. Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211211, at 8. 
 260. Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 26. 
 261. Id. at 10–11. It appears, however, that this forthcoming cooperative agreement may 
be signed by the FWS, agency personnel, and stakeholders, rather than by the Interior 
Secretary and state and tribal elected officials. Id. (describing who is eligible to serve on the 
RIP executive committee, and indicating they would sign “a Cooperative Agreement with 
the Service,” meaning the FWS). 
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The RIPs are somewhat less uniform regarding another state role: 
funding program operations. States collectively provide half the total cost 
of the Platte RIP (although only 16% of the cash),262 a small fraction (less 
than 10%) for the Upper Colorado RIP,263 and none for the San Juan 
RIP.264 Funding for the Middle Rio Grande RIP is not yet settled, although 
it seems likely that the vast majority of the money will be federal,265 as is 
true in the other programs. 
Once adopted, every RIP gives states and stakeholders a continuing 
role in carrying out the program by awarding them seats on a standing 
committee responsible for implementation. Each program gives this  
committee a different name: the Recovery Implementation Committee in 
the Upper Colorado,266 the Coordination Committee in the San Juan,267 the 
                                                                                                                      
 262. Under the Platte RIP authorizing legislation, “States shall contribute not less than 
50 percent of the total contributions necessary to carry out the Program.” Platte River 
Recovery Implementation Program and Pathfinder Modification Project Authorization, Pub. 
L. No. 110-229, § 515(b)(3)(A), 122 Stat. 754, 848 (2008). Only $30 million in cash is  
required from the states, however, compared to a federal spending authorization of $157 
million. Id. §§ 515(b)(3)(B)(i), 515(b)(6)(A). Contributions of water or land for the program 
are to make up the rest of the states’ share of the cost, although “in-kind goods or services” 
may also be allowed if approved by the Governance Committee. Id. §§ 515(b)(3)(B)(ii), 
515(b)(3)(C). 
 263. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 5-3 ($200,000 out of a 
$2.3 million annual budget in the original program document). The percentage of state 
funding is slightly smaller today, as state contributions have roughly doubled to just under 
$400, but the total annual budget has nearly tripled to around $6.5 million. COLORADO 
RIVER RECOVERY PROGRAM FY 2012 DEPLETION CHARGE AND ANNUAL BUDGET 
ADJUSTMENTS (2011), available at http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documents-
publications/budget-documents/cpitbl/cpitbl12.pdf. 
 264. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 34 (explaining federal funding 
sources for program). The states of Colorado and New Mexico provide cost-share funding 
for certain capital projects under the program, although the federal share is much larger. Id. 
at 43. 
 265. “It is anticipated that funding to the RIP will be provided by entities to address 
ESA covered actions. Funding can be provided in the form of cash or in-kind contributions. 
Reclamation’s authorizing language requires non-federal entities to provide a 25 percent cost 
share . . . .” Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 23. Federal 
agencies contributed around 90% of the cost of ESA activities on the Middle Rio Grande 
from 2001–2011. Id. 
 266. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 3-1 to 3-3 (one seat 
each for the FWS, the USBR, and an official from the Western Area Power Administration; 
one seat for each of the three states; one seat each for water development interests and 
conservation groups). 
 267. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 34. One seat each is for 
participants in the program; participants as of 2010 were four federal agencies, two states, 
four Indian tribes, “water development interests,” and “conservation interests.” Id. at 29. 
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Governance Committee in the Platte,268 and the Executive Committee in 
the Middle Rio Grande.269 Similarly, the RIPs vary regarding whether and 
how new entities may be added to these committees.270 
The ground rules of these RIP committees ensure that the participating 
states and stakeholders have great influence in program decision-making. 
The Upper Colorado RIP Implementation Committee operates by consen-
sus.271 The other committees can act only through supermajority vote, 
including two-thirds for the San Juan RIP Coordination Committee272 and 
three-quarters for the Middle Rio Grande RIP Executive Committee.273 
Remarkably, the Platte RIP Governance Committee can act only by affirm-
ative votes of nine out of its ten members, including all of the state and 
federal government representatives.274 These decision rules allow relatively 
small minorities—in some programs, even outliers—to keep a RIP from 
changing course over their objections. 
4. Recovery Actions 
Implementation efforts focus on a set of recovery actions, developed by 
each program to benefit the listed species in each basin.275 Each RIP has 
                                                                                                                      
 268. Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 19 (one vote each for the three states, 
one vote each for three categories of water users, two votes for conservation groups, and two 
votes for the Interior Department). 
 269. Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 10. The 
initial membership is the same as the Collaborative Program Executive Committee. See supra 
note 254. 
 270. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 3-2 (“[O]ther agencies 
may participate if they execute an agreement in support of this program.”); San Juan RIP 
Program Document, supra note 13, at 29 (no vote of the Coordination Committee needed if 
the State of Utah should sign the RIP cooperative agreement), 34 (indication that new 
participants may be added without them signing the cooperative agreement); Platte River 
RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 19 (no indication that Governance Committee may be expanded); 
Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 10-11 (describing 
process and criteria for adding new entities to the Executive Committee). 
 271. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 3-1. The document 
does not define “consensus.” 
 272. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 34. (“Unresolved issues will 
be referred for resolution to the Signatories” of the cooperative agreement for the RIP.). 
 273. Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 13. However, 
certain matters can only be changed by unanimous consent, including provisions of the RIP 
declaring that the program will not impair water rights or compact obligations, that the RIP 
will acquire water only from willing sellers, and the “principles governing ESA compliance 
and regulatory predictability under the RIP.” Id. at 13, 22–23. In all matters, however, the 
committee “shall seek consensus in reaching decisions.” Id. at 13. 
 274. Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 19.  
 275. This statement is not meant to suggest that the years spent developing the plans 
were spent entirely on negotiations, particularly in areas of significant scientific uncertainty. 
For example, the Governance Committee requested a National Academy of Sciences review 
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generated (or will generate) a list of more-or-less specific measures relating 
to particular species and their ecosystems. These measures provide the 
elements of long-term plans designed to move the species toward recovery,276 
and these plans guide the work and funding delivered by the programs.277 
The San Juan RIP program document explains that the “Long Range Plan 
(LRP) identifies multi-year research, monitoring and recovery actions 
necessary to support the program’s goals . . . . The LRP is the Program’s 
research, monitoring, and implementation document.”278  
A detailed, program-by-program review of recovery prescriptions is  
beyond the scope of this article, but each RIP has identified certain categories 
of actions that are necessary to help the species recover, or at least help the 
program understand what is needed for recovery. The San Juan RIP, for 
example, identifies five categories: (1) “protection, management, and  
augmentation of habitat,” which includes providing adequate flows in the 
San Juan River and resolving barriers to fish passage; (2) “water quality 
protection and enhancement;” (3) “interactions between native and non-
native fish species,” primarily involving efforts to reduce predation and 
competition from other types of fish; (4) “monitoring and data management,” 
including assessing the status and trends of fish populations and the  
progress toward recovery; and (5) “protection of genetic integrity and  
management and augmentation of populations,” which includes raising and 
stocking endangered fish while safeguarding the genetic diversity of the 
wild populations.279 The Upper Colorado RIP’s five listed recovery  
elements are not much different280—not surprisingly, as this program  
                                                                                                                      
of the science underlying the Platte River program, which began in January 2003 and took 
over two years to complete. See Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 7–8.  
 276. The Upper Colorado program refers to its long-term plan as the Recovery Im-
plementation Program Recovery Action Plan (RIPRAP). The RIP program participants 
developed this plan “using the best, most current information available and the recovery 
goals for the four endangered fish species. It identifies specific actions and time frames 
currently believed to be required to recover the endangered fishes in the most expeditious 
manner in the Upper Basin.” UPPER COLORADO ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM, 
RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM RECOVERY ACTION PLAN (RIPRAP), preface 
(2012), available at http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documents-publications/foundational-
documents/RIPRAP/RIPRAPapril4-03.pdf. 
 277. The Middle Rio Grande RIP is still developing its long-term plan, but once 
completed it will become a “guidance document that provides an inventory describing 
beneficial activities that may be implemented by the RIP to meets its purposes and goals,” 
and will provide a foundation “for the ongoing 5-year RIP Action Plan.” Middle Rio Grande 
RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 14–15. 
 278. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 1, 13. 
 279. Id. at 13, 14–21 (providing additional detail on these categories). 
 280. The primary differences are that the Upper Colorado list has two habitat elements 
instead of one, and does not have a water quality category. See Upper Colorado RIP Program 
Document, supra note 12, at 1-6 to 1-8. 
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covers the same two fish species as the San Juan RIP, plus two others.281 
And the Middle Rio Grande RIP—driven primarily by the needs of the Rio 
Grande silvery minnow—can be expected to adopt similar categories of 
measures as the program takes shape.282 
The Platte RIP recovery elements are different from the others in at 
least two notable respects. First, because three of the four target species are 
birds that rely on lands and meadows along the Central Platte River,283 this 
program focuses more on riparian lands than the others.284 One of its two 
major habitat goals is summarized as “Land Habitat Restoration: protect 
and/or restore 10,000 acres of habitat in the Central Platte area,”285 while 
the other is to provide an annual average of 130,000 to 150,000 acre-feet to 
improve flows in the Central Platte.286 Second, the Platte RIP is explicitly 
incremental in its approach to habitat restoration: in the current “First 
Increment” of thirteen years,287 the program seeks to provide only about 
one-third of land and water that FWS believes is required for the species’ 
habitat needs.288 In other words, the RIP is not seeking to meet all the 
habitat needs of the species in its first thirteen years, but only to provide a 
down payment of the necessary land and water for the Central Platte.289 
                                                                                                                      
 281. The Upper Colorado RIP focuses on four listed fish species: the bonytail chub, 
Colorado pikeminnow (formerly called squawfish), humpback chub, and razorback sucker 
(which was listed after the RIP was created). Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, 
supra note 12, at 2-1. The San Juan RIP focuses on the Colorado pikeminnow and razorback 
sucker. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 9–10. 
 282. The RIP’s long-term plan will include “categories of RIP activities including: 
physical habitat restoration and management; water management; predator/non-native 
control; population augmentation/propagation (silvery minnow only); water quality  
management (silvery minnow only); research, monitoring and adaptive management;  
policies and laws; public information and outreach; and Program management.” Middle Rio 
Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 14.  
 283. The bird species are the interior least tern, piping plover, and whooping crane; the 
fish species is the pallid sturgeon. See PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION 
PROGRAM FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, SUMMARY, S-31 to S-33 (2006), 
available at https://www.platteriverprogram.org/PubsAndData/ProgramLibrary/TC-
R190%20PRRIP%20FEIS%20Summary.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Platte 
RIP FEIS Summary]. 
 284. Id. at S-36 to S-38 (describing habitat characteristics needed to benefit the species). 
 285. Id. at S-35.  
 286. Id. A third goal is to “test the assumption” that pallid sturgeon habitat in the 
Lower Platte can be improved by managing flows in the Central Platte. Id. 
 287. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERVICE, PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, VOL. 1, at 1-1, 1-2 (2006). 
 288. Id. at 1-3 (summarizing the FWS objectives of 29,000 acres of habitat protected/ 
restored along the Central Platte, and average annual flow improvements of 417,000 acre-
feet). 
 289. See Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 4 (“Interior proposed a phased 
Program to address habitat restoration with the Program’s First Increment achieving roughly 
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A common theme of the RIPs’ approach to conservation is their reliance 
on adaptive management principles for making decisions. Adaptive  
management is a “learning by doing” approach that employs certain  
techniques: “identify key questions in relationship to multiple hypotheses, 
develop and utilize predictive tools to evaluate management action choices, 
design and implement management ‘experiments,’ conduct linked monitoring 
and research, and reassess hypotheses and management actions.”290 A 2011 
article by a member of the Platte RIP implementation team offers a  
detailed explanation of that program’s use of adaptive management.291 The 
Upper Colorado and San Juan RIP program documents do not use the 
term, but do call for decisionmaking using adaptive management principles.292 
The newer Middle Rio Grande RIP program document contains a whole 
section on the subject, declaring that the RIP will “use adaptive manage-
ment as a structured and systematic approach for designing, implementing, 
monitoring and evaluating management actions to maximize learning about 
critical scientific questions and uncertainties that affect management  
decisions . . . .”293 
5. Approach to Section 7 Compliance 
As noted above, one of the two major purposes of every RIP is to  
ensure compliance with ESA section 7 for existing water use and management 
activities in the river basin, as well as for new water development actions.294 
The approach to section 7 compliance is therefore a crucial feature of the 
Upper Colorado, San Juan, Platte, and Middle Rio Grande RIPs, and the 
program documents for each one address the matter in some detail. Here 
again, each program is somewhat unique, but several features appear in 
most or all of these RIPs. 
                                                                                                                      
one-third of these land and river flow improvements . . . while allowing for  
monitoring and research to increase understanding of the species’ needs and the most 
effective ways to provide habitat improvements.”). Whether the Platte RIP will deliver 
further “payments” remains to be seen, however; additional land and water may depend on 
several factors, including results of studies on the habitat needs of the species. 
 290. Chadwin B. Smith, Adaptive Management on the Central Platte River: Science, 
Engineering, and Decision Analysis to Assist in the Recovery of Four Species, 92 J. ENVTL. 
MGMT. 1414, 1416 (2011). 
 291. Id. 
 292. See Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 4-20, 4-21  
(describing research, monitoring, and data management as recovery elements); San Juan 
RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 13-14 (describing the program’s Long Range Plan as 
relying heavily on research and monitoring to develop recovery measures and assess their 
effectiveness). 
 293. Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 20. 
 294. See supra notes 240–248 and accompanying text. 
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First, each RIP is meant to provide the necessary measures to avoid 
jeopardy (and adverse modification of critical habitat) that would otherwise 
result from federal actions relating to water management and development. 
Many such actions had already been the subject of section 7 consultations 
prior to development of the RIPs, and the FWS had issued jeopardy opinions 
based on flow depletions and other adverse effects on the species and their 
habitats.295 Anticipating more jeopardy opinions, the RIP participants 
intended that certain program recovery measures would provide the RPAs 
that would allow these actions to proceed.296 In the words of the Upper 
Colorado RIP, “Activities and accomplishments under the RIP are intended 
to provide the reasonable and prudent alternatives which avoid the likelihood 
of jeopardy to the continued existence of the endangered Colorado River 
fishes . . . resulting from depletion impacts of new projects and all existing 
or past impacts related to historic projects . . . .”297 Providing predeter-
mined RPAs is probably the most legally and practically important feature 
of the RIPs.298 
Second, three of the four RIPs provide for ongoing FWS review to  
ensure the program is actually making progress,299 considering both the 
implementation of recovery actions and the status of the species.300 The San 
Juan RIP, for example, provides that at the time a section 7 consultation is 
initiated, FWS “will determine if progress toward recovery has been suffi-
cient for the Program to serve as a reasonable and prudent alternative or 
measure,”301 and will “assess the sufficiency of Program actions in propor-
tion to the potential impacts of a proposed federal action.”302 This type of 
                                                                                                                      
 295. See supra notes 223–230 and accompanying text. 
 296. “The RIP is intended to provide the reasonable and prudent alternatives for 
projects undergoing Section 7 consultation in the upper basin.” UPPER COLORADO 
ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM, AGREEMENT, SECTION 7 CONSULTATION, 
SUFFICIENT PROGRESS, AND HISTORIC PROJECTS § II (1993, revised 2000) [hereinafter 
Upper Colorado RIP § 7 Agreement]. 
 297. Id. § III.1. Certain discharges of pollutants by historic projects are not covered, 
however. The RIP is also intended to provide the RPAs that avoid destruction or adverse 
modification of critical habitat. Id. 
 298. This feature is common to all the RIPs. See id. (Upper Colorado); San Juan RIP 
Program Document, supra note 13, at 69; Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 5 
(providing RPA for previously completed consultations and “ESA offsetting measures” for 
not-yet-completed ones, including “the ongoing operations of Federal water projects in the 
Basin”); Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 15–16, 19–20. 
 299. The exception is the Platte RIP, which does not call for such periodic determinations 
by FWS, but only provides more generally for adaptive management and monitoring as 
program elements. Platte RIP FEIS Summary, supra note 283, at S-41, S-42.  
 300. See Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 16.  
 301. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 69. The Upper Colorado RIP 
includes a similar provision. Upper Colorado RIP § 7 Agreement supra note 296, § III.5. 
 302. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 69. The San Juan and Upper 
Colorado RIPs have nearly identical criteria for such determinations, addressing the benefits 
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determination is not triggered solely by new consultations, however. The 
San Juan RIP also requires the FWS every two years to prepare “a written 
‘Sufficient Progress’ Assessment of the Program’s Progress towards recovery, 
the Program’s ability to provide ESA compliance for water development 
and management activities, and any corrective actions needed to ensure 
future ESA compliance, in accordance with the Program’s Principles.”303 
Such “sufficient progress” determinations are made every year for the Upper 
Colorado RIP,304 and the Middle Rio Grande RIP also requires the FWS to 
issue them annually.305  
Third, the RIPs requiring “sufficient progress” determinations give  
detailed instructions in case the FWS should determine that the program is 
not making sufficient progress to serve as an RPA. The first option in the 
San Juan and Upper Colorado is simply to specify which RIP recovery 
measures must be implemented in order to avoid jeopardy due to a particular 
action.306 If the FWS believes that the program does not include the  
necessary measure(s) to avoid jeopardy, however, it must give the RIP 
implementation committee the chance to resolve the issue. In the Middle 
Rio Grande, the FWS may document a lack of sufficient progress and 
formally ask the committee to remedy the issue; “It is fully intended that it 
will be feasible for the [committee] to take whatever corrective actions are 
needed to achieve sufficient progress and that resolution will occur.”307 The 
San Juan RIP allows the committee to incorporate new measures suggested 
by FWS into the program’s long-term plan, although that is “expected to be 
                                                                                                                      
of RIP actions for the species, the status of fish populations, the adequacy of flows, and the 
magnitude of impacts resulting from the activity undergoing consultation. Id. at 36; Upper 
Colorado RIP § 7 Agreement supra note 296, § II. 
 303. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 32. The FWS is also required 
to notify the RIP Coordination Committee in writing if the FWS “concludes, at any time 
and independent of any consultation, that the Program is not implementing actions on 
schedule, and that this may impact the ability of the Program to provide reasonable and 
prudent alternatives or measures.” Id. at 71. 
 304. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., REGION 6, FINAL 2011–2012 ASSESSMENT OF 
“SUFFICIENT PROGRESS” UNDER THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER ENDANGERED FISH 
RECOVERY PROGRAM IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN, AND OF IMPLEMENTATION 
OF ACTION ITEMS IN THE JANUARY 10, 2005, “FINAL PROGRAMMATIC BIOLOGICAL OPINION 
ON THE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR ENDANGERED FISHES IN THE YAMPA RIVER BASIN” 1-2 
(July 18, 2012), available at http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documents-publications/ 
section-7-consultation/sufficientprogress/2012SufficientProgressMemo.pdf (indicating annual 
nature of “sufficient progress” determinations). 
 305. Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 16. 
 306. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 70; Upper Colorado RIP § 7 
Agreement, supra note 296, § III.6, at 2. The latter provision requires FWS to confer with 
the RIP Management Committee to identify such measures. 
 307. Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 17. If the 
problem is not resolved, the FWS may conclude that sufficient progress has not been  
maintained, which “may or may not trigger re-initiation of consultation.” Id. 
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a rare event.”308 The Upper Colorado RIP suggests that the committee may 
revise existing recovery measures as needed to “restore” the RIP as an 
RPA.309 If that should fail, however, “as a last resort the FWS will develop” 
an RPA, working with the federal agency and project sponsor.310 In short, 
all these programs emphasize that the RIP provides the actions needed to 
avoid jeopardy, and should the FWS find that the RIP is falling short, the 
implementation committee is expected to find the solutions.311 
With this approach to ESA compliance, the RIPs seek to provide  
increased certainty—and perhaps decreased burdens—for water-related 
activities subject to section 7 consultation requirements. The Platte River 
RIP Environmental Impact Statement goes into remarkable detail on these 
points, not only stating that the RIP would “provide ESA ‘regulatory  
certainty’ ” for covered activities,312 but also detailing the stiffer requirements 
and greater costs that could result from consultations in the absence of a 
RIP.313 The Middle Rio Grande RIP says it most plainly, declaring that the 
program participants “intend that the inclusion of the RIP as the conservation 
measure in the new BO provides regulatory certainty under the ESA” for 
the covered actions.314  
B. The Legal (and Political) Success of RIPs 
This Article focuses primarily on the creation, structure and procedures 
of RIPs, rather than on their success in achieving their stated goals. One 
certainly could say, however, that the established RIPs in the Upper Colorado, 
San Juan, and Platte River Basins have succeeded from a legal standpoint.315 
This is true in at least three respects, each involving a different branch of 
government. 
                                                                                                                      
 308. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 70. 
 309. Upper Colorado RIP § 7 Agreement, supra note 296, § III.8, at 3-4.  
 310. Just in case anyone should miss the point, this statement is followed by the  
parenthetical, “(RIP participants recognize that such actions would be inconsistent with the 
intended operation of the RIP.)” Id., § III.11, at 4.  
 311. This is true even though all the programs recite, in somewhat different terms, that 
final determinations regarding jeopardy remain with the FWS. Id., §§ II, at 1-2; San Juan 
RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 71; Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program 
Document, supra note 16, at 16.  
 312. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION AND FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, VOL. 2, at 2 (2006). 
 313. Id. at 3–6. It also declared, “It is highly likely that the basin-wide costs to achieve 
ESA compliance for projects under separate section 7 consultations (nonstreamlined) would 
be greater than the costs associated with a cooperative, basinwide [RIP].” Id. at 11. 
 314. Middle Rio Grande RIP Draft Program Document, supra note 16, at 15–16.  
 315. It is too soon to say whether the brand-new Middle Rio Grande RIP will succeed 
in the same ways. 
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The first legal success involves ESA compliance, one of the two main 
purposes of these programs. In every situation thus far where FWS has 
determined whether a RIP does enough to avoid jeopardy, the RIP has 
passed the test. The FWS has issued an unbroken string of “sufficient  
progress” determinations for the Upper Colorado RIP from 1995 through 
2012.316 The San Juan RIP has a much shorter record, but the FWS has 
found sufficient progress both times it has assessed the program (2005 and 
2010);317 moreover, the FWS found sufficient progress in issuing a “no 
jeopardy” opinion for the new Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project,318 
which will bring treated water from the San Juan River to many areas of the 
Navajo Nation that have lacked a potable water source.319 The Platte RIP 
plan resulted in a 2006 “no jeopardy” opinion covering the effects of  
Reclamation project operations and other activities in the basin,320 and the 
FWS has done hundreds of streamlined consultations relying on the  
program.321 Thus, at the administrative level, the RIPs have delivered the 
envisioned section 7 compliance. 
                                                                                                                      
 316. See Sufficient Progress Process, UPPER COLO. RIVER ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY 
PROGRAM, http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/documents-publications/section-7-consultation/ 
sufficient-progress-letters.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2012). This page contains links to 
seventeen of these determinations, one for every year except 2007, which range in length 
from two pages (1995) to fifty-four pages (2009). Each one concludes that the RIP provides 
sufficient progress to avoid jeopardy for projects with depletions below a certain threshold, 
which has been 4,500 acre-feet since 2001. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERV., REGION 6, SUFFICIENT PROGRESS/SECTION 7 CONSULTATIONS—UPPER COLORADO 
RIVER RECOVERY PROGRAM (July 20, 2001), available at http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/ 
documents-publications/section-7-consultation/sufficientprogress/2001July20.pdf. For several 
years in the last decade, however, the FWS stated that it was “very concerned about recent 
downward trends in endangered fish populations.” See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., REGION 6, FINAL 2007–2008 ASSESSMENT OF “SUFFICIENT PROGRESS” 
UNDER THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM IN THE UPPER 
COLORADO RIVER BASIN (July 3, 2008), available at http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/ 
documents-publications/section-7-consultation/sufficientprogress/2008Jul03.pdf. 
 317. E-mail from David Campbell, San Juan River RIP, to author (Aug. 15, 2012, 07:03 
MDT) (on file with author). 
 318. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. FINAL BIOLOGICAL 
OPINION FOR THE NAVAJO-GALLUP WATER SUPPLY PROJECT 74–83 (2009), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/EIS/navgallup/FEIS/vol2/Appdx-C/Appdx-C-pt3.pdf. 
 319. See Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/navajo/nav-gallup/index.html (last updated Dec. 3, 2012) (sum-
marizing the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project, and noting that Congress authorized it 
through Pub. L. 111-11 in 2009). 
 320. See Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 17–18, 25–28. 
 321. “During the Cooperative Agreement Era (1997–2006), approximately 400 stream-
lined Section 7 consultations were done. To date, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has 
provided nearly 100 streamlined Section 7 consultations since the Program began.” PLATTE 
RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM, BI-ANNUAL REPORT, 2009 & 2010 (2011), 
available at https://www.platteriverprogram.org/News/Documents/PRRIP Biannual Report 
2009-2010.pdf. 
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Second is litigation—or rather the absence of it—over whether the 
RIPs are meeting ESA requirements. The Upper Colorado and San Juan 
RIPs have for years provided section 7 compliance for over 2,300 water 
projects, including every USBR project in the Upper Colorado River Basin, 
with no lawsuits challenging the adequacy of this compliance.322 Neither has 
the Platte RIP been the subject of ESA litigation,323 despite the number 
and significance of the projects relying on the program for their section 7 
compliance.324 The judiciary has decided many cases regarding federal water 
projects and endangered species in the last twenty years,325 but the RIPs 
have been remarkably successful in keeping these issues out of the courts. 
Third, Congress has acted to provide authority and funding for imple-
mentation of the three established RIPs. The first statute came in 2000,326 
authorizing up to $46 million for the USBR to carry out capital projects 
under the Upper Colorado and San Juan programs,327 and also allowing the 
Interior Secretary to use up to $6 million in Colorado River Storage Project 
hydropower revenues for annual base funding of the RIPs.328 Over time, 
Congress extended the authority and increased the funding for capital 
projects;329 the 112th Congress extended the base funding through 2019 by 
approving a bipartisan bill, H.R. 6060.330 The Platte RIP got its authoriz-
ing legislation in 2008,331 allowing the Secretary to take certain actions in  
                                                                                                                      
 322. Endangered Fish Recovery Programs Extension Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 6060 
Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, Water and Power Subcommittee, 112th Cong. (2012) 
(statement of John W. Shields, Interstate Streams Engineer, Wyoming State Engineer’s 
Office) [hereinafter Shields Testimony]. 
 323. Telephone Interview with Jerry Kenny, Executive Director, Platte River Recovery 
Implementation Program, in Kearney, Neb. (Aug. 16, 2012). 
 324. See Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 25–27 (six existing water projects on 
the Colorado Front Range requiring special use permits from the U.S. Forest Service; major 
hydropower projects in Nebraska requiring relicensing by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission; USBR water projects on the North Platte; and a large number of “small 
depletions” projects). 
 325. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
 326. Upper Colorado and San Juan River Basins Endangered Fish Recovery Programs, 
Pub. L. 106-392, 114 Stat. 1602 (2000). 
 327. Id. § 3(a), 114 Stat. 1603. The total cost of these capital projects was capped at 
$100 million, id. § 3(b), and the statute identified the sources of the other $54 million. Id. 
§ 3(c), 114 Stat. 1604. 
 328. These expenditures were capped at $4 million per year for the Upper Colorado 
and $2 million per year for the San Juan in 2000 dollars, to be adjusted for inflation over 
time. Id. § 3(d), 114 Stat. 1604–1605.  
 329. See Shields Testimony, supra note 322 (summarizing statutory changes made in the 
107th, 109th, and 111th Congresses). 
 330. Pub. L. 112-270 (2013), introduced as the Endangered Fish Recovery Programs 
Extension Act of 2012, H.R. 6060, 112th Cong. (2012) (introduced with eight Republican 
and five Democratic cosponsors).  
 331. Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-229, § 515, 122 Stat. 
754, 847 (2008). 
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implementing the program332 and authorizing over $157 million in federal 
money.333 Thus, Congress has not only shown its support of the RIPs, but 
has backed that support with significant investments in federal resources. 
These attributes—highly reliable section 7 compliance for the water 
sector, cooperation rather than litigation over ESA requirements, and  
significant federal contributions to these programs—have earned the RIPs 
political support from western states, water users, and political officials who 
are not known as enthusiastic supporters of the Endangered Species Act. 
For example, eight House Republican members of the conservative Western 
Caucus were original co-sponsors of H.R. 6060,334 even though the caucus’s 
website harshly criticizes the ESA and suggests the law should be 
scrapped.335 Testifying in support of this bill, a Wyoming state official 
described “substantial grassroots support” from the federal, state, tribal, and 
stakeholder participants in the Upper Colorado and San Juan RIPs: “These 
diverse interests continue to demonstrate that working cooperatively  
produces far greater results than independent efforts.”336 Another witness 
explained that he had once supported repeal and replacement of the ESA, 
but he now supported H.R. 6060 on behalf of several Colorado water  
suppliers, 
because it is the best way to avoid uncertainty and the economic 
and social costs experienced by other areas of the West that have 
been plunged into chaos by conflicts between water supply needs 
and endangered species. The risks of not having a successful Program 
are far too great . . . . [T]hose risks include years of litigation at 
best, and potentially a devastating disruption of water supplies that 
are critically important to cities, agriculture and industry.337  
                                                                                                                      
 332. Id. § 515(b)(2). 
 333. Id. § 515(b)(6), 122 Stat. 849. 
 334. Reps. Bishop and Chaffetz (both from Utah), Lummis (Wyoming), Pearce (New 
Mexico), Gosar (Arizona), and Tipton, Gardner, and Coffman (all from Colorado), all 
Republicans, are listed as sponsors of H.R. 6060, 112th Cong. (2012). All of them are also 
listed as members of the Western Caucus for the 112th Congress. Membership, CONG. W. 
CAUCUS, http://www.westerncaucus.pearce.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=62&sectiontree=2,62 
(last visited Aug. 16, 2012). 
 335. The caucus charges the ESA with “the dramatic destruction of property rights and 
the failure to recover species . . . . If environmentalists and politicians really cared about the 
animals, they would get rid of the Act and give landowners the freedom to do what they do 
best—produce necessary resources while taking care of the land and all who inhabit it. ESA 
has been a failure . . . .” Issues, CONG. W. CAUCUS, http://www.westerncaucus.pearce.house.gov/ 
issues1 (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). 
 336. Shields Testimony, supra note 322, at 2. 
 337. Endangered Fish Recovery Programs Extension Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 6060 
Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, Water and Power Subcommittee, 112th Cong. (2012) 
(statement of Bennett W. Raley, attorney representing the Northern Colorado Water  
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On the other hand, four of the five House Democrats sponsoring the bill 
have strong lifetime voting scores from the League of Conservation Voters 
(LCV);338 Colorado Senator Mark Udall has a nearly perfect lifetime LCV 
score,339 and he was lead sponsor of the Platte RIP authorizing legislation 
while serving in the House.340 Thus, although some political support for 
RIPs comes from people who oppose the ESA for its “environmental  
radicalism,”341 the established programs have also drawn support from those 
with strong conservation credentials. 
In short, both legally and politically, these programs represent a real 
departure from the usual ESA approach. While their ultimate goal is recovery, 
they also provide a different means of avoiding jeopardy to listed species 
than the usual section 7 consultation process. The next section analyzes 
some of these differences in considering the popularity of the RIPs and 
their prospects for future success. 
IV. ANALYSIS: QUESTIONS ABOUT THE POPULARITY AND FUTURE 
OF RIPS FOR WESTERN WATERS 
Recovery Implementation Programs have become an accepted means of 
ESA compliance and an established part of the water management regime 
in the western United States. While the RIPs have done well in legal and 
political terms, this success raises questions about the reasons for their 
popularity, the chances that they can actually recover listed species, and the 
prospects that they will become even more important over time.  
                                                                                                                      
Conservancy District) (declaring support for the bill from the Front Range Water Council, a 
coalition of entities supplying water to several major cities in Colorado). 
 338. Democratic Reps. Coffman, DeGette, and Polis (Colorado), Lujan (New Mexico) 
and Matheson (Utah) are all listed as sponsors of H.R. 6060, 112th Cong. (2012). The 
League of Conservation Voters keeps an annual scorecard of key environmental votes in 
Congress, and gives individual members a percentage rating, with the highest percentages 
being the most pro-environment. See, e.g., LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCORECARD ’10 at 1 (2011). Through 2010, three of H.R. 6060’s  
Democratic cosponsors had lifetime LCV scores of at least 96% (DeGette, Lujan, Polis), 
Perlmutter was at 86%, and Matheson was at 64%. Id. at 22, 29, 35. 
 339. Id. at 10 (97% through 2010). 
 340. See H.R. REP. No. 110-393, at 5 (2007). 
 341. See Laura Petersen, Endangered Species: House GOP Touts Fish Recovery Programs 
But Still Demands ESA Reforms, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, July 11, 2012 (quoting House Water 
and Power Subcommittee Chairman Tom McClintock, who also stated, “This and future  
Congresses still have a lot of work to do in reforming the Endangered Species Act, but in 
the meantime, [H.R. 6060] offers some common-sense solutions”). 
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A. Why Have RIPs Caught On in the Western Water Context? 
Several factors may explain why RIPs have become a preferred means 
of ESA compliance in western river systems with major USBR water  
projects. These factors largely reflect familiar concerns and priorities of 
water users and managers in the West. 
First, the established RIPs have proved reliable in ensuring section 7 
compliance for federal actions relating to water management, development, 
and use. They have not only produced a steady stream of findings that 
jeopardy will be avoided, but have done so without serious interference with 
established or planned water use activities, and without litigation. In other 
words, they have effectively kept project operations and water uses on the 
Upper Colorado, San Juan, and Platte from a wrenching and contentious, 
Klamath-style disruption. 
Second, these programs have increased the importance of states in  
carrying out the ESA. In contrast to the very limited role for states in the 
typical consultation process,342 the RIPs give them significant authority in 
determining the measures needed for section 7 compliance, and in overseeing 
implementation of these measures. The western states have sought greater 
influence in ESA decisionmaking; the Western Governors’ Association 
(WGA) has stated, “The Endangered Species Act can effectively be  
implemented only through a full partnership between the states, federal 
government, local governments, and private landowners.”343 The RIPs 
provide that kind of partnership (for the states at least), and an enhanced 
role is particularly vital to them in the water resource context, where the 
western states have zealously guarded their authority over allocation and 
management. 
Third, RIPs can provide a corresponding benefit to the USBR and  
project water users by involving more entities in activities to benefit listed 
species and their habitats. The standard section 7 approach focuses on a 
particular federal action, such as operation of a reclamation project, and 
requires avoidance of jeopardy that might be caused by that one action—
even where the species is in trouble due to a variety of other actions, such as 
non-project water use. Those parties associated with a project going 
through consultation may feel they are carrying an unfair burden to save the 
species, as reflected in Interior’s failed attempt to limit its responsibility for 
Klamath River ESA flows to its proportionate share of Klamath Basin water 
                                                                                                                      
 342. See supra notes 104–105 and accompanying text. 
 343. WESTERN GOVERNORS’ ASS’N POLICY RES. 10-12, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 3 
(2010). This policy statement calls for ESA reauthorization consistent with four basic prin-
ciples, one of which is to “[e]nhance the role of state governments in recovering species.” Id. 
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use.344 This explains the Interior Secretary’s statement, in support of the 
Platte River RIP, that involving all major water users “allows for a more 
equitable distribution of effort than what might occur under separate  
project consultations. Separate project consultations do not focus on issues 
of equity and fair share, but rather focus only on offsetting the effects of the 
project currently in consultation.”345 
Fourth, the established RIPs have enjoyed relatively secure funding 
under their federal authorizing legislation—particularly the two RIPs that 
have received a dedicated share of federal hydropower revenues in the  
Colorado River Basin.346 They also provide an opportunity for non-federal 
entities to bear part of the expense of program implementation, although 
the vast majority of the money is still federal.347 Whatever their source, 
funds need to be reliably available, particularly in those programs that must 
regularly show “sufficient progress” in implementation.348 For the San Juan 
RIP, “[f]unding reliability is critical to the success of the Program to ensure 
that the Program is conducted on a continuous basis and that high priority 
recovery elements are funded every year.”349 
Fifth, in addition to reliable funding, RIPs may provide certain benefits 
for species that might be difficult or impossible to achieve under a typical 
section 7 consultation. The Interior Secretary emphasized this point in 
approving the Platte RIP, explaining that water released from upstream 
federal projects may need to travel hundreds of miles to reach the key habitat 
in the Central Platte. This water “often crosses state lines and always passes 
many diversion points. Without the cooperation and assistance of the states 
and other water users, much of the water being moved to the Central Platte 
Habitat Area could be diverted or stored by other projects.”350 Similarly, 
protecting endangered fish from predation or competition by non-native 
                                                                                                                      
 344. Because the federal Klamath Project represented 57% of Klamath Basin irrigation, 
the 2002 BO for project operations required the project to provide only 57% of the necessary 
flows for most of the period it covered. See supra notes 148–154 and accompanying text.  
 345. Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 6. 
 346. These revenues do not depend on annual appropriations. As noted above, Congress 
recently renewed the hydropower funding for the Upper Colorado and San Juan RIPs. See 
supra notes 327–337 and accompanying text.  
 347. See infra notes 367–370 and accompanying text. Non-federal funds could come 
from water users or water project sponsors as well as states. The Upper Colorado RIP has 
always provided for non-federal water project proponents to pay a small fee to FWS based 
on the amount of water the new project would deplete—originally $10 per acre-foot—with 
the proceeds split evenly between acquisition of water for instream flows, and other recovery 
activities. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 5-4. It appears, however, 
that such “depletion charges” were never expected to be a major source of funding for the 
program. Id. at 5-3. 
 348. See generally supra notes 299–305 and accompanying text.  
 349. San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 42. 
 350. Platte River RIP ROD, supra note 211, at 5-6.  
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fish—a key feature of both the Upper Colorado and San Juan RIPs351—may 
be very difficult to achieve without the cooperation of state fish and wildlife 
authorities. Thus, while the RIPs have obvious benefits for states, water 
users, and the USBR, they also offer some advantages for listed species. 
One might say that these programs have become popular for many of 
the same reasons that settlements have become the preferred means of 
resolving tribal Winters claims—that is, many of the perceived advantages of 
RIPs over typical section 7 consultations are similar to the perceived ad-
vantages of settlements over litigation of tribal reserved rights.352 For the 
western states, benefits include a prominent “seat at the table” where deci-
sions are made, and the resulting power to protect their water users from 
disruption or uncertainty that might otherwise result from implementation 
of federal law. Just as settlements often give tribes some tangible benefits, 
including funding, that would be difficult to obtain through adjudication of 
water rights alone, the RIPs may offer similar gains for listed species that 
consultation ordinarily would not. And both RIPs and Winters settlements 
allow all parties, including the United States, to avoid the cost and uncer-
tainty of litigation, and at least some of the acrimony that can result from a 
hard-fought legal and political battle over water. Of course, advocates for 
tribes and listed species might find similar, legitimate reasons to criticize 
the negotiated approaches for diluting the benefits that should have flowed 
from Winters353 and the ESA,354 respectively. But in the context of western 
                                                                                                                      
 351. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.  
 352. For a brief summary of tribal water right settlements, see supra notes 44–48 and 
accompanying text.  
 353. In an article focusing on Winters claims to restore streamflows for the benefit of 
tribal fisheries, Michael Blumm and his co-authors stated, “[a]lthough tribal reserved water 
rights claims may open the door to discussions about streamflow restoration, in practice the 
McCarran Amendment Era has reduced these claims to mere bargaining chips rather than 
vehicles for achieving the purpose of reservations through streamflow restoration.” Michael 
C. Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian Reserved Water Rights and Western Streamflow Restoration 
in the McCarran Amendment Era: A Promise Unfulfilled, 36 ENVTL. L. 1157, 1161 (2006); see 
also Thomas P. Schlosser, Dewatering Trust Responsibility: The New Klamath River Hydroelectric 
and Settlement Agreements, 1 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 42 (2011) (criticizing, from the 
standpoint of tribal resource protection, the negotiated agreements in the Klamath Basin, 
discussed supra notes 190–198 and accompanying text). 
 354. In an article analyzing the application of the ESA to restore native fish in the 
Columbia and Upper Colorado Rivers, Mary Wood concluded that “the Services in both 
basins may be straying far from the ESA’s mandate of conserving ecosystems upon which 
imperiled species depend. . . . Applying section 7 in this way, the ESA becomes, in effect, 
statutory permission for perpetuating a status quo harmful to species.” Mary Christina 
Wood, Reclaiming the Natural Rivers: The Endangered Species Act as Applied to Endangered River 
Ecosystems, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 251–52 (1998). “The implementation of the ESA in both 
basins has suffered from an unwillingness to force changes to the Developed River, despite 
section 7’s strong mandate calling upon federal agencies to ‘insure’ that their actions are not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of species.” Id. at 284. 
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water resources, where certainty and state authority are fiercely held and 
widely recognized values, it is not surprising that federal law evolved to 
accommodate them. 
B. Can the RIPs Actually Succeed in Recovering Listed Species? 
Much of this Article focuses on the RIPs as an alternative to the usual 
approach to ESA consultation, and as discussed above, these programs have 
been regarded as successful largely because they have provided consistent 
and predictable section 7 compliance.355 Their very name, however, indicates 
another way that these programs differ from standard consultations: their 
goal is to recover threatened and endangered species, not just to avoid 
jeopardy caused by federal actions. In the context of dramatically altered 
and heavily utilized western river systems, however, this goal of recovery is 
exceedingly ambitious. 
While promoting recovery certainly sounds better for listed species than 
simply avoiding jeopardy, it is fair to question whether even that more 
modest goal might be better served by the usual section 7 approach: consul-
tation on a federal action, a BO with an RPA that focuses specifically on 
that action (assuming the BO finds jeopardy), and possibly judicial review 
of the BO. Some might point to the cases upholding ESA obligations for 
fish in the Klamath356 and Middle Rio Grande357 and argue that so long as 
the courts continue to insist that saving endangered species remains “the 
highest of priorities,”358 the standard consultation process—with rigorous 
judicial oversight—remains the best hope for ensuring that listed species 
and their habitat get the water they need.359 
A broader view of the record, however, shows that ESA section 7 has 
had very mixed results, legally speaking, in protecting species from harm 
caused by existing federal water projects. Three cautionary points emerge 
from the earlier discussion of the Lower Colorado, Klamath, and Middle 
                                                                                                                      
 355. The success of these programs in ensuring compliance with the ESA, however, 
should not be mistaken for success in achieving recovery of listed species. The Upper Colorado 
RIP has been criticized for focusing too much on the former: “If consensus-based manage-
ment were not a virtually automatic route to [RPA] status, measures of success would rely 
less on bureaucratic process and more on progress toward species recovery.” Ann Brower, 
Chanel Reedy & Jennifer Yelin-Kefer, Consensus versus Conservation in the Upper Colorado 
River Basin Recovery Implementation Program, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1001, 1005 (2001) 
(“[A]ctual population growth, rather than bureaucratic accomplishments, should serve as the 
appropriate gauge.”). 
 356. See supra notes 152–158 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra notes 169–176 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra notes 1–3, 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court 
decision in TVA v. Hill and its famous “highest of priorities” quote). 
 359. See Wood, supra note 354, at 252–85 (arguing for stronger judicial oversight of 
ESA decisions regarding river operations to promote recovery of listed species). 
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Rio Grande consultations.360 First, in all three basins, the relevant Service 
issued a BO that arguably protected the federal project’s established opera-
tions far better than it protected the listed species.361 Second, the Services 
did have some success in the courts, winning preliminary rounds in both 
the Middle Rio Grande362 and the Klamath,363 and of course prevailing on 
the Lower Colorado when the Ninth Circuit held that the FWS had broad 
discretion in choosing an RPA.364 Third, the legal victories for listed species 
were not the end of the story, either in the Klamath—where the Ninth 
Circuit decision invalidating the BO was followed by lengthy multilateral 
negotiations on a broader agreement for the basin365—or in the Middle Rio 
Grande, where Congress quickly passed an appropriations rider partially 
overturning the court cases and blocking judicial review of the new BO.366 
In short, it is difficult to say whether the standard section 7 approach would 
be superior to a RIP in preventing jeopardy, because it is so hard to predict 
how the usual consultation-and-litigation sequence would play out in a 
particular basin.367  
Federal project operations may be slow to change even where the courts 
insist on stronger measures to save listed species, as shown by the never-
ending battle over the ESA and the Federal Columbia River Power System. 
Plaintiffs committed to saving Pacific Northwest salmon have had great 
                                                                                                                      
 360. See supra Part II.B. 
 361. See supra notes 133–134, 144–145, and 170–171, and accompanying text. The 2002 
Middle Rio Grande BO was the most extreme in this regard, finding jeopardy, providing no 
RPA, but still allowing project operations to continue. 
 362. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973 (D.N.M. 2002)  
(upholding 2001 BO even though the government was wrong regarding its discretion to 
provide project water for listed species). 
 363. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 
F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that litigation began with a request by plaintiffs for 
a temporary restraining order, denied by the district court); id. at 1090 (explaining that 
district court had overturned one aspect of the 2002 Klamath BO but upheld the rest, and 
leaving the BO and RPA in place while it was revised) (9th Cir. 2005). 
 364. Sw. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515, 
523 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 365. See supra notes 188–194 and accompanying text.  
 366. See supra notes 176–184 and accompanying text. The Tenth Circuit vacated its 
controversial 2003 decision as moot early the following year. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. 
Keys, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). Years later the Tenth Circuit vacated all the decisions 
in the litigation, based on mootness. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. U.S. Bureau of  
Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2010).  
 367. John Echeverria acknowledged this point in an article that was otherwise quite 
critical of the collaborative approach to ESA compliance on the Platte. “It is simply impossible 
to know what might have transpired if [Interior] had pursued one of several other political 
strategies.” Echeverria, supra note 226, at 561. He also noted that the Platte collaborative 
program apparently helped turn back efforts in the 1990s to weaken the ESA, and that 
“[p]erhaps nothing more is needed to declare the Platte program a success in these terms.” 
Id. at 592. 
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success in challenging a string of BOs on the operation of federal hydro-
power dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers.368 Moreover, a recently 
retired U.S. district judge has worked doggedly to hold the federal agencies 
accountable, taking extraordinary measures in prodding them to produce a 
BO that can pass legal muster.369 As chronicled by Michael Blumm, however, 
the federal agencies have continually resisted making major changes in the 
hydropower system to benefit the salmon,370 seeking instead to avoid  
jeopardy through measures such as projected habitat improvements in 
Columbia and Snake River tributaries.371 Today, federal operations on the 
Columbia remain out of compliance with the ESA,372 nearly two decades 
after a federal judge declared that the approach to salmon protection was 
seriously flawed “because it is too heavily geared towards a status quo that 
has allowed all forms of river activity to proceed in a deficit situation—that 
is, relatively small steps, minor improvements and adjustments—when the 
situation literally cries out for a major overhaul.”373 
The point is that federal water projects—especially big ones providing 
major economic benefits—present a formidable challenge for ESA imple-
mentation. I am not suggesting that the challenge is too great for the usual 
section 7 approach, or that the standard consultation-and-litigation model 
has not resulted in real benefits for listed species in this context. But certain 
                                                                                                                      
 368. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge in ESA: District 
Judge James Redden and the Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 
2013) (describing this litigation from the mid-1990s to the present, including the remand of 
multiple BOs on Columbia—Snake operations). 
 369. Id. (manuscript at 30–64) (analyzing the role of District Judge Redden in pursuing 
adequate remedies under the ESA). 
 370. Blumm has described the federal agencies as “practiced at the art of deception” in 
implementing the ESA on the Columbia. Michael C. Blumm & Erica Thorson, Practiced at 
the Art of Deception: The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery under the Endangered 
Species Act, 36 ENVTL. L. 709 (2006); Michael C. Blumm & Hallison T. Putnam, Imposing 
Judicial Restraints on the “Art of Deception”: The Courts Cast a Skeptical Eye on Columbia Basin 
Salmon Restoration Efforts, 38 ENVTL. L. 47 (2008). 
 371. One fairly recent development is the Columbia Basin Fish Accords of 2008, 
involving the Bonneville Power Administration, the Corps of Engineers, the USBR, four 
Columbia Basin tribes and two states. According to Bonneville, these agreements “will result 
in numerous new projects and dedicated funding for certain on-going projects (such as 
watershed restoration programs) throughout the Columbia River Basin for the next 10 years. 
The agreements also mark a turning point for the parties, ushering in a collaborative part-
nership rather than continuing with an adversarial relationship.” BONNEVILLE POWER 
ADMIN., ADMINISTRATOR’S RECORD OF DECISION, 2008 COLUMBIA BASIN FISH ACCORDS 
1 (May 2, 2008), available at energy.gov/sites/prod/files/nepapub/nepa_documents/RedDont/ 
EIS-0312-ROD-01-2008.pdf. 
 372. Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Or. 
2011) (finding the 2008/2010 BO for the Federal Columbia River Power System arbitrary 
and capricious). 
 373. Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 866, 
900 (D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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tough realities seem undeniable: the construction and operation of federal 
water projects has dramatically altered western river ecosystems, often to 
the grave detriment of native species; large numbers of people and dollars 
now depend on continuing established operations of these projects; and 
major operational changes will meet powerful and determined resistance, 
even if scientists and federal judges insist that such changes are needed for 
the survival of listed species.  
If avoiding jeopardy is so daunting in this context, can recovery even be 
realistic? The answer will of course depend on the specific factors affecting 
a particular species, and the feasibility of addressing those factors without 
major changes in water management. It is possible that some species can be 
restored through measures such as stocking, small-scale habitat restoration, 
and fish passage improvements. But Dale Goble’s analysis of successful 
recovery efforts374 shows that for most of the delisted species, “their decline 
was primarily a result of a specific, eliminable threat . . . and—the factor 
that may have trumped the rest—the species are habitat generalists that can 
flourish in human-impacted environments.”375 Many of the West’s native 
fishes, facing multiple threats and requiring more natural river conditions 
than those prevailing today,376 do not fit this pattern. And any species 
whose basic habitat needs conflict with established water project operations 
is likely to face a long and uncertain road to recovery.377 
To their credit, the RIP program documents do not undersell the  
magnitude of the task, either in the range of measures needed to benefit the 
species378 or in the time that may be required to achieve recovery.379 The 
Upper Colorado RIP stated at the outset that recovery “will involve a  
massive, long-term program of 15 years and will succeed only with the close 
cooperation of all affected parties.”380 That was in 1987, yet today the four 
                                                                                                                      
 374. See Dale D. Goble, The Endangered Species Act: What We Talk About When We Talk 
About Recovery, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 22 (2009) (identifying common elements of 
species that were recovered to the point where they could be delisted under the ESA). 
 375. Dale D. Goble, A Fish Tale: A Small Fish, the ESA, and Our Shared Future, 40 
ENVTL. L. 339, 354 (2010). Goble identified an additional factor: the adequacy of pre-
existing regulatory mechanisms to protect the species after delisting. Id. 
 376. See, e.g., San Juan RIP Program Document, supra note 13, at 9 (listing several 
human-caused impacts on San Juan River native fishes); Upper Colorado RIP Program 
Document, supra note 12, at 6-1 to 6-4 (listing factors for decline of four native Upper 
Colorado fish species). 
 377. See generally Marian Lyman Kirst, Pallids in Purgatory, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, 
Sept. 17, 2012, at 10 (describing obstacles to recovering the endangered pallid sturgeon in the 
heavily developed and altered Missouri River system).  
 378. See supra notes 275–289 and accompanying text.  
 379. The Platte RIP suggests that restoring Central Platte habitat will be a forty-year 
effort, with the program currently seeking to do the first third of the job in its initial  
thirteen years. See supra notes 287–289 and accompanying text.  
 380. Upper Colorado RIP Program Document, supra note 12, at 3-1. 
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Upper Colorado native fish species remain on the endangered species list,381 
where two of them have resided since 1967.382 The inability to achieve  
recovery may be viewed as a failure of the RIP, but that seems a harsh 
assessment given the challenges of restoring aquatic species while allowing 
uninterrupted water use and development.383 So long as the West remains 
unwilling to “jeopardize” hydropower production or consumptive water uses 
for the sake of restoring fish habitat, recovery of many native species will 
remain a nearly impossible task. 
C. Are RIPs the Way of the Future? 
Whatever the challenges RIPs may face in recovering species, their 
demonstrated success in legal and political terms384 suggests that we may 
see a push to establish them in other basins where the ESA has implications 
for water project operations. But while the RIPs have clear advantages 
(especially for states and water users) that may make them a popular 
choice,385 the larger legal and political context raises questions about their 
future. These questions apply even to the existing programs, all of which 
allow any signatory to withdraw.386 
A major reason why RIPs have gained support, at least among water 
users,387 is fear of the alternative: the dreaded “next Klamath,” where appli-
cation of the ESA to water project operations could significantly reduce 
water supplies for existing users, causing economic losses and political 
controversy. This threat may become less worrisome, however, either 
through rule or statutory changes if the White House or Capitol Hill seeks 
to weaken the ESA, or through case law if the courts decide that the USBR 
has limited discretion to change project operations for the benefit of listed 
                                                                                                                      
 381. See Species Reports, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.ecos.fws.gov/ 
tess_public/pub/listedAnimals.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2013) (listing the bonytail chub, 
Colorado pikeminnow, humpback chub, and razorback sucker as endangered).  
 382. See Endangered Species Program, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/ 
endangered/species/faq-first-species-listed.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2013) (explaining the 
original endangered species list under a 1966 forerunner to today’s ESA; species listed 
include the Colorado squawfish (now pikeminnow) and humpback chub). 
 383. “Given the obvious conflicts between those who want to develop the water and 
those who want to retain instream flows, it would have been surprising if consensus-based 
management in the Colorado River had been effective at recovering the fishes while developing 
water use.” Brower et al., supra note 355, at 1006. 
 384. See supra Part III.B.  
 385. See supra notes 342–354 and accompanying text.  
 386. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT FOR RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR 
ENDANGERED SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN, supra note 216, at 2 (1988); 
PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, supra 
note 15, at 3; SAN JUAN RIP PROGRAM DOCUMENT, supra note 13, at 48. 
 387. See supra note 337 and accompanying text (Bennett Raley remarks). 
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species.388 And if the ESA becomes less fearsome to western states and 
water users, they are likely to ask themselves why they should participate in 
a time-consuming and seemingly endless ESA collaborative program.389  
Federal spending cuts represent another potential problem for RIPs. 
With the exception of the Platte, where half of program costs are borne by 
the states, the RIPs are overwhelmingly paid for with federal dollars. But 
the current Congress has pushed to cut discretionary spending, and agency 
budgets may shrink significantly in the coming years.390 If the RIPs lack 
reliable federal funding, they may find it hard to maintain “sufficient  
progress” toward recovery,391 putting the programs at risk of failing to  
provide section 7 compliance. In addition, slippage in implementation could 
mean that environmental groups abandon the RIPs, potentially shifting 
them from participants to plaintiffs.392 Perhaps the programs could survive 
budget cuts, perhaps the states and/or water users could increase their  
contributions, perhaps the RIPs could keep all their key players at the  
table . . . but if federal funding for the RIPs should dry up, their future is in 
doubt. 
The RIPs may have gained support because they involve federal, state, 
and local entities cooperating to protected endangered species,393 but in 
today’s political climate they could draw opposition on that basis. If hardcore 
conservatives portray the ESA as a broken law needing reform, the federal 
government as a heavy-handed oppressor, and political compromise as a 
betrayal of principle, some western politicians may hesitate to embrace even 
                                                                                                                      
 388. See, e.g., Grand Canyon Trust v. Bureau of Reclamation, 2012 WL 3264499 at *6–
9 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding the USBR’s annual operation of Glen Canyon Dam nondiscretion-
ary for section 7 purposes); Benson, supra note 96, at 40–51 (analyzing the USBR’s discretion 
for section 7 purposes, and arguing that project operations should normally be considered 
discretionary). 
 389. One Wyoming state official said in 2004 that he did not like the Platte River 
collaborative process, but that Wyoming would stay in it so as to prevent “another Klamath.” 
Andrew Beck Grace, Truce Holds on the Platte River, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Aug. 16, 2004), 
http://www.hcn.org/issues/280/14930. 
 390. See Amena H. Saiyid, Alan Kovski, and Jonathan Nicholson, Environmental 
Programs Would Take Hit Under Reductions Outlined in Budget Act, 43 ENV’T REP. 2422 (2012) 
(explaining a White House report detailing budget cuts—including a $196 million cut to the 
FWS budget—under automatic reductions agreed to by Congress and the White House in 
2011). 
 391. See supra notes 306–311 and accompanying text.  
 392. These problems may be especially acute for the Middle Rio Grande RIP, as this 
new program has neither authorizing legislation nor environmental participation as of this 
writing. 
 393. As then-Congressman John Salazar of Colorado said of the Upper Colorado and 
San Juan RIPs in 2006, “This program can serve as a national model for public and private 
partnerships for endangered species recovery. It allows water development in accordance to 
[sic] the State and Federal laws to continue while the partners work to recover the endangered 
fish species.” 152 CONG. REC. H653 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of Rep. Salazar). 
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these “successful” programs. Such reluctance could doom new efforts to 
resolve ESA issues collaboratively, such as the negotiated agreement in the 
Klamath Basin which is now in limbo due to opposition from the Tea Party,394 
and may even cause some participants to leave the existing RIPs.395 Indeed, 
when then-Governor Freudenthal “reluctantly” signed Wyoming onto the 
Platte River RIP in 2006, he wrote that he took comfort in knowing that, 
“if at any time the Program progresses in a direction counter to the best 
interests of Wyoming, I can push away from the table and take a different 
course.”396  
The RIPs have become an established means of ESA compliance in the 
context of western river basins—one which western states and water users 
have come to support. But even this collaborative model requires agreement 
on certain principles: conserving endangered species is a legitimate mandate 
of federal law; government has a major role to play in meeting that  
mandate; restoring species is a goal worthy of substantial investment of 
public funds; and recovering species while protecting water users will  
require sustained engagement, patience, and compromise from all parties. 
Continued acceptance of these principles among states and elected officials 
may lead to new RIPs for river-dependent species in the West. But if these 
principles are increasingly challenged, support for the programs may begin 
to erode, causing even longtime participants to question their commitment. 
It is not difficult to imagine the collapse of one or more existing programs, 
particularly if federal funding is interrupted or reduced. 
Despite these significant threats, RIPs seem likely to survive—and 
perhaps even expand their range—in the western river systems to which 
they are endemic. The longevity of the Upper Colorado and San Juan RIPs 
indicates that, once established, these programs have staying power. And 
there is reason to believe that new programs will continue to be established: 
the last decade has not only seen the consummation of the Platte RIP and 
the birth of a brand-new program for the Middle Rio Grande, but also the 
creation of the Edwards Aquifer RIP397 and the Missouri River Recovery 
                                                                                                                      
 394. See supra notes 188–196 and accompanying text. A local Tea Party group organized 
in opposition to the KBRA and managed to defeat the local elected officials who supported 
the deal. One of the new officials, elected with Tea Party backing, says that the KBRA is “not 
going to go anywhere at all” and is “dying on the vine.” William Yardley, Tea Party Blocks Pact 
to Restore a West Coast River, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2012, at A16. 
 395. Indeed, Klamath County, Oregon voted in 2013 to withdraw from the KBRA. 
Klamath County Officials Vote to Drop Out of the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement, 
OREGONLIVE.COM, Feb. 27, 2013, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/ 
02/klamath_county_officials_vote.html. 
 396. Press Release, Governor Dave Freudenthal, Governor Signs On to Platte River 
Agreement (Nov. 27, 2006), available at http://www.ridenbaugh.com/nwrd/sub/0701%20nwrd.pdf. 
 397. See supra notes 20–22 and 208 and accompanying text. 
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Implementation Committee.398 In addition, other river basins have seen 
their ESA-water conflicts give way to multi-party negotiations, which have 
produced broad agreements for the Klamath Basin399 and the RIP-like 
MSCP for the Lower Colorado.400 So long as the ESA remains a major 
concern for western water managers and users, they will seek practical 
options that provide compliance while minimizing uncertainty and avoiding 
litigation, and the RIPs have shown that they can do the job. 
CONCLUSION 
Recovery Implementation Programs have become an established,  
alternative approach to ESA compliance in the context of western river 
systems with major federal water projects. If the RIPs are judged solely on 
their ability to achieve recovery of listed species, the jury is still out—and 
may stay out for decades longer. In many respects, however, these programs 
may be deemed a success. Western states and water users, especially, have 
gained meaningful seats at the table, giving them an ability to control their 
destiny and gain a level of certainty that is unique in the section 7 context. 
These programs also represent a credible effort to address Congress’  
directive for federal agencies to cooperate with state and local entities on 
water resource issues, consistent with conservation of listed species. 
Because of the membership and decision rules of their implementation 
committees, the RIPs could fairly be seen as emphasizing cooperation over 
conservation, and thus failing to make recovery “the highest of priorities.”401 
But the ESA does not command federal agencies to choose the best course 
of action for listed species, only to avoid jeopardizing their continued  
existence—and the courts give the FWS significant discretion in how that is 
done. The RIPs have allowed water project operations and other federal 
actions to gain predictable section 7 compliance with relatively little  
controversy, reliable funding, and no litigation. In the high-stakes game of 
western water, these programs have allowed the USBR and project water 
users to avoid jeopardy, without the questions. 
                                                                                                                      
 398. See supra notes 19 and 209 and accompanying text. 
 399. See supra notes 189–196 and accompanying text. 
 400. The Lower Colorado MSCP is not a RIP because it does not focus on recovery, 
but its origins, participation, conservation measures, and approach to ESA compliance are all 
similar to those found in the established RIPs. See supra notes 200–207 and accompanying text. 
 401. See Brower et al., supra note 355, at 1006 (calling the Upper Colorado RIP “a 
failing recovery program based on a successful consensus-based bureaucracy”). 
